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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the application of commercial best practices for new technology
development within the constraints of the defense contract funded research and
development (R&D) environment. Key elements of successful new product
development (NPD) are identified from the literature, including strategic fit,
organizational structure, financial considerations, and use of Stage-GateTM type
processes. Constraints, conflicts, and issues which arise in the defense contract funded
R&D world but not in the commercial world are explored, including a multiplicity of
funding sources, short funding cycles, and ambiguous ownership of go/kill decisions and
gating criteria. Existing defense industry Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and new
Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness Level (EMRL) and Manufacturing Readiness
Level (MRL) metrics are evaluated as potential gating mechanisms relevant to the
defense industry. We determine that the EMRL and MRL metrics meet many of the
criteria necessary for good NPD gates, but they must still be supplemented by
commercial best practices such as ensuring strategic fit, good organizational structure,
financial attractiveness and competitive evaluation. A resulting combined framework of
"soft" and "hard" criteria is applied to a case study of an optical component currently
under development with contract R&D dollars. The output of this study helped to shape
strategic decisions regarding this component and to identify next steps in the technology
maturation roadmap. Application of these frameworks in defense should ensure that
future successful technical performance is also supported by an appropriate business
strategy and by a process maturation plan for manufacturing consistent with the
upcoming Department of Defense (DOD) MRL requirements.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The defense industry today is looking for ways to improve new product
development processes in order to deliver new technologies on schedule and within
budget. Recent studies have shown that use of commercial industry best practices for
new product development, especially addressing manufacturing concerns early in the
technology development timeline, correlates well with meeting cost and schedule
targets [1]. This has driven some changes in defense policy to build a knowledge-based
process for product development decisions into the defense acquisitions structure. On the
positive side, it is recognized that the policy itself has been updated to reflect the
recommendations of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to incorporate more
commercial best practices into technology development requirements [2]. On the down
side, it is also recognized that "acquisition officials are not effectively implementing the
revised acquisition policy's knowledge-based process," so the desired improvements in
outcome are not yet being realized [2].
On the whole, the approach taken to date has been primarily a top-down
approach: it operates on the premise that to achieve use of commercial best practices in
technology development for the defense industry, mandates must flow from the
Department of Defense (DoD) through program offices to contractors performing the
work. This has resulted in "roughly 11 revisions to DoD's acquisition policy between
1971 and 2005" [2]. However, "despite these efforts, defense acquisition programs in the
past three decades continued to routinely experience cost overruns, schedule slips, and
performance shortfalls" [2].
This observation prompts one to question whether a top-down approach is the
most effective means towards implementing commercial best practices into new product
development for defense. Put another way, what could be the effect of independently
applying commercial best practices for new product development from the very early
stages of technology creation, on the part of the contractor, in a bottom up approach?
What steps can government contractors take on their own to emulate commercial best
practices to ensure optimal performance on the contracts they win? How should they
adapt commercial best practices to meet constraints of the contract-funded research and
13
development environment? Finally, as DoD policies are slowly changed to mandate
more use of commercial best practices from top down, how can contractors best ready
themselves for upcoming changes?
In this thesis, we will explore these questions as they apply to early stage
technology development using defense contract research and development (R&D)
dollars. We will first outline in Chapter 2 key elements of successful commercial new
product development as studied in the literature. In Chapter 3 we will identify constraints
or conflicts which arise in the defense contract funded R&D world but not in the
commercial world, and their implications. We will also identify practices which are
directly addressed by some of the top-down changes being made in the defense world.
While commercial best practices recommend using technology gating mechanisms such
as Stage-GateTM processes [3], [4], in Chapter 4 we will consider several approximately
parallel mechanisms developed by various government funding agencies: existing
Technology Readiness Level (TRL, [5]) and new Engineering and Manufacturing
Readiness Level (EMRL, [6]) and Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL, [7], [8])
frameworks will be compared in order to provide a recommendation of the most suitable
metric for a given program.
Finally, we will examine how the resulting best practices might be applied, using
a case study of a technology currently in early stage R&D. On the business side, in
Chapter 5 we will explore issues such as strategic fit, organizational leadership, and
financial attractiveness, and how these may shape future development paths. On the
technology development side in Chapter 6, we will evaluate elements of the technology
against MRL metrics to identify potential critical issues such as sole/foreign sourcing,
design maturity precedence requirements, and process control capabilities. It is
recognized that "up to 85% of costs are committed during design and development" [8]
so this is truly an opportunity to explore how early in the process recommendations could
be made to impact success at later stages.
Through this bottom up approach, we will seek to identify key issues which can
impact long term success of a technology development project. We will also try to
evaluate the longer term implications of the top-down approach being proposed through
14
the GAO and DoD. Specifically, if a product development team uses the manufacturing
readiness framework, will the contractor be better positioned in the long run? Is this
framework sufficient? If not, what other types of concerns should be addressed during
technology development? Learnings both specific to our case study and applicable to the
defense industry in general will be summarized in Chapter 7. We hope through this work
to provide a case for taking a pro-active approach to technology development and
manufacturing readiness in defense contract work, independent of the pace of official
DoD policy changes.
15
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Chapter 2: Commercial Best Practices for New Product Development
Commercial new product development (NPD) and how to do it well has been the
subject of extensive research for several decades, especially as globalization has
increased the number of competitors in the market and as the speed of technological
change has increased. Although the products developed within the defense industry may
not have as extensive a customer base or as broad a market appeal as products in the
commercial sector, it is quite reasonable to expect that using practices which lead to
successful commercial products will also lead to successful defense products (and firms).
Indeed, GAO studies have shown that DoD programs which most closely followed
commercial best practices "had better outcomes" in terms of schedule and cost [1]. Thus
it is well worthwhile to consider how a defense contractor might incorporate commercial
best practices into new technology development efforts in order to reap benefits both for
the contractor and for the DoD. What are the key elements to NPD success? What
modifications may be needed to adapt these to the defense environment? How do
commercial best practices compare to the best practices being recommended by the
GAO?
In this chapter we will review commercial best practices for new product
development. These can be separated into critical success factors from process and
product standpoints. On the process side, we will also review characteristics leading to
high quality execution of Stage-GateTM processes. Finally, we will review recommended
must-meet criteria for early phase milestone reviews. We will use our learning here as a
foundation for the next chapter, in which we will identify constraints which are likely to
affect implementation in the defense industry.
2.1 Critical success factors
To first order, success in new product development can be simplified to "doing
projects right" and "doing the right projects," according to Robert Cooper, author of
Winning at new products: Accelerating the process from idea to launch [3] and Product
leadership: Creating and launching superior new products [4], from which books the
bulk of this chapter is drawn. In these works, Cooper has synthesized extensive research
identifying how successful firms do new product development and how other companies
17
fail at similar efforts. "Doing the right projects" means selecting products for
development which meet key strategic and market criteria and which demonstrate
technical and financial feasibility. "Doing projects right" focuses on elements of
execution: these include issues such as organizational structure, leadership, and the use
of frameworks such as the widely adopted Stage-GateTM process for new product
development. Cooper uses these two broad groupings to separate critical NPD success
factors into elements of process and elements of product. Although it is tempting to
focus on elements of product first, a key learning is that firms which do well have an
appropriate NPD process in place, which allows them to identify which projects or
products are in fact the right ones to pursue.
2.1.1 Commercial NPD process success factors
Studies of successful firms have shown that their NPD processes share six
primary characteristics, summarized in Table 2-1. First, good NPD processes emphasize
early and ongoing evaluation of products and projects, both before work begins and as
the project proceeds. The main two causes of new product failure are "inadequate market
analysis" and "product problems or defects" [3]. Both of these causes can be mitigated
by making sure that the process includes detailed analysis of market and technical issues
before a project is given a green light and significant resources are spent. For this reason,
up-front market and technical homework, integration of the voice of the customer, and
clear product definition are the top three criteria for a good NPD process (see Table 2-1,
adapted from [4]). Markets can change, unforeseen technical hurdles may arise, and
uncertainties at project inception may be resolved either positively or negatively as time
goes on, though, so it is also important to have an ongoing evaluation of the firm's
project portfolio. Good NPD processes thus include specific decision points at which
projects are reviewed and at which projects are terminated: having and using "go/kill"
decision points is the fourth critical success factor. Studies show that for each successful
new product, there are 1.3 to 1.5 product launches, three to four products in development,
and seven to eleven new product ideas [3], so it is clear that there must be an appropriate
culling method to narrow the number of projects in the NPD funnel (see Figure 2-1).
Costs and resource requirements typically increase at each development stage, and down-
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selection between projects allows firms to concentrate their resources on projects with the
best probability of success [9].
1 "Management emphasizes doing up-front [market and technical] homework... before
projects enter the Development phase"
2 NPD process "emphasizes a strong market orientation" and "the voice of the
customer"
3 Product definition occurs "before Development work begins"
4 The process has clear go/kill decision points and projects are actually killed.
5 "Quality of execution" is emphasized
6 The NPD process is "complete or thorough ... but ... also flexible."
Table 2-1. Critical NPD process success factors, from [4].
IDEAS
.W DEVELOPMENT PRODUCT
4) PROGRAMS LAUNCHES
L
II-
0
Time
Figure 2-1. Schematic project down-selection funnel in top commercial firms.
All of the above point to the need to have a process and to stay with it, which
leads to the fifth and sixth critical success factors for good NPD processes: executing
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projects and process well, while at the same time incorporating enough flexibility into the
NPD process so that the process itself does not become a barrier to success. These two
success factors go hand in hand. First, a focus on quality of execution, making sure that
corners are not cut even when time and resource pressures make cuts tempting, helps to
avoid the pitfall of accidentally skipping over key elements such as the up-front market
and technical investigation. Second, the emphasis on flexibility recognizes that there is
competition for time and resources and the NPD process should not consume these in a
non-value added manner or in an exclusive manner. Where resource competition does
require compromise, flexibility in the process may be allowed, for example in the timing
of a specific step, but decisions must be made consciously with recognition of the
associated risks, and a plan for subsequent recovery or accommodation. This last
element is in fact the natural evolution [4] after a firm has successfully met the first five
criteria, not a justification for skipping them as some might hope. Formal new product
development processes started as fairly rigid "checklist" type first-generation processes in
the 1960s which focused on ensuring task execution and completion within functional
domains. These evolved into second generation Stage-GateTM processes emphasizing
cross functionality and integration across the organization (e.g., marketing, engineering,
and manufacturing), up-front work, and best practices. Companies which have
successfully implemented second-generation processes have been able to learn from these
to make conscious decisions for streamlining or parallel processing in their current
programs, leading to what are now called third-generation processes. These firms'
proficiency comes, though, from the years of practice with the more formal approach, just
as the skill and proficiency of a performer or an athlete may come from hours of drilling
and practice. As cautioned in [4], companies should "strive first for a basic and effective
new product process" before advancing to a more flexible process. They must learn to
"walk before [they] run."
2.1.2 Commercial NPD project success factors
Once a firm has a good process in place to facilitate execution of NPD projects,
individual firms and individual projects may still succeed or fail. Across firms, there is
competition in the new product marketplace, while within firms the NPD process itself
will involve culling of projects. Studies have shown that successful technology
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development efforts also share several critical success factors, both internally with firms,
and externally facing the market. Cooper has synthesized these to seven critical success
factors of successful firms, reproduced in Table 2-2. Of the seven factors, four seem to
be primarily inwardly (1) focused or controlled: resource commitment, organizational
structure, design and climate, product synergies with firm core competencies, and speed
of execution. Three factors focus on the product relative to external (E) competition:
having a superior product, having a broad international focus, and being sold into an
attractive market.
1 Resource commitment to the NPD project from senior management I
2 Having a superior differentiated product that delivers unique benefits and better E
value to the customer
3 The right organizational structure, design, and climate
4 Look to the world product: an international orientation E
5 Leverage core competencies: Synergy with the base business and its strengths I
(vs. "step-out" projects)
6 Use market attractiveness for project selection and prioritization E
7 Speed, without sacrificing quality of execution
Table 2-2. Critical NPD project success factors, adapted from [4].
2.1.2.1 Inwardly controllable elements of success
The most important internal factor is having resource commitment from senior
management. Adequate staffing and budget must be provided for critical new product
projects. This means not only providing resources, but also ensuring that those resources
are available to support the project. On the people side, personnel must not be assigned
to too many projects such that they become overwhelmed and cannot support any of them
well. On the financing side, sufficient resources must be committed at each phase in the
NPD process to enable the team to reach the objectives of that phase.
The resources committed by senior management must then be fed into the
appropriate organizational structure, design, and climate. Here, key elements of success
include "having an assigned team of players" who form a "cross-functional team" with a
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"dedicated," "defined," "empowered" and "accountable" team leader. Better success
comes from having a leader who is "responsible for the project from beginning to end,"
not just during one project phase. Similarly, better success is correlated with this project
leader being "dedicated to [only] one project at a time." The team, however, must bring
together views from across the organization, including "multifunction (and outsider)
representation on development projects from the start" [10]. As an example, a team
might include representatives from R&D, engineering, marketing, finance, and
operations. The team can be organized in many different ways. These include (1)
functionally, or (2) in a functional matrix, in both of which cases authority remains with a
functional head, (3) in a balanced matrix (e.g., with authority shared between a project
manager and functional heads), or (4) in a project matrix or (5) a project team, in which
latter cases authority primarily rests with the project manager and functional managers
only provide personnel. Success rates are much higher for the three latter forms, while
the functional approaches tend to underperform in terms of schedule, cost, and technical
performance [3]. Finally, projects which are structured to have frequent
communications, formal and informal, do better. Formally, team members meet for
project updates and progress reviews and are kept apprised of the state of the project as it
goes through the NPD process. Informal communications are facilitated by co-location,
preferably setting up team members to work within 100 m of one another [4].
Successful firms also develop products that are synergistic with their core
competencies and strengths, and which support their base business. Synergy can come
from both technological and marketing arenas [4]. Technologically, the product should
build on existing skills, technology, and resources, including any existing manufacturing
or operations base. Market-wise, the product does better if it fits well into the existing
sales and distribution channels of the firm, and can utilize existing market resources.
Conversely, products which are "step-out" or new-to-the-firm products tend to do quite
poorly. Cooper reports failure rates as high as 77% when both marketing and
technological fit are poor, and failure rates of 67% and 59% when one of technology fit
and marketing fit are poor, respectively [4]. The highest success rates accompany
projects with at least moderate marketing fit and moderate to good technology fit.
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Finally, the last internal factor correlated with product success is speed, provided
that quality of execution does not suffer. Here, speed is translated into an ability to be
one of the first movers in the market, ideally with the notion of capturing more value.
Research shows this to be true, but also shows that second and third movers in the market
may still retain high success rates and positive profitability [4]. Rather than emphasize
speed for its own sake, Cooper prefers to emphasize quality of execution which will
translate into faster speed to market. By doing things right the first time, building in up-
front homework, voice-of-the-customer, and cross-functional inputs, a team can avoid
having to repeat poorly executed steps later in the process. Speed is thus a result of a
well executed process, not a goal in and of itself.
2.1.2.2 Externally related elements of success
We have focused to this point on success elements which are at least in theory
somewhat controllable by the firm itself. We turn now to the external factors which
correlate with new product success. Here, the firm still has an internal choice to make, in
terms of whether or not to pursue a particular project or product, but external factors can
determine whether or not the product under consideration is likely to be successful.
The most critical external factor is, of course, having a product which is truly
superior and unique in the eyes of the customer. This means the product or technology
"meets customers' needs better than competing products," provides them with better
quality, gives them access to "unique benefits and features," and "solves problems with
competitive products." The product should "reduce the customer's total in-use costs"
and have at least some "highly visible benefits." Innovation and novelty do enter into
criteria for unique, superior products, but their importance falls behind the six factors
listed above. Note also that the relevant perspective in all evaluations is that of the
customer. Using a "technology push" approach, in which a firm invents a technology or
a device, deciding internally what it is the customer wants, is in fact one of the two most-
common causes of failure [4]. Convincing firms that technology push is a poor strategy,
however, is clearly a challenge: despite the fact that it delivers only "mediocre
performance," about one-fourth of businesses choose to pursue a technology push
approach [3]. Although payoffs in some cases can be high, neglecting market orientation
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leads to targeting unattractive markets, with "little fit, synergy, or focus in the types of
products and markets exploited" [3].
Market importance is also emphasized in the other two critical external factors:
having an international "look-to-the-world" product, and selecting products based on
market attractiveness. Although designing for a global market may be less relevant for a
defense contractor who typically designs only for one customer (the U. S. Government,
and perhaps sales to approved allies), it is worth noting at least one reason why having an
international focus is important: products which are designed for the world market "do
better abroad" and "also do better in the home market" [3]. Awareness of potential
international competition raises the "standard of excellence" and the project team
develops a product which is superior to those developed by firms with only a local focus.
Finally, actual market attractiveness is important in order to target products which will
yield returns for the firm. Growing markets with customer pull for the product are most
attractive, especially when the product life cycle is still in growth stages. However, even
products targeted at highly competitive markets are only marginally less successful than
products targeted at highly attractive markets: All of the other factors, especially product
superiority, quality of execution, and synergies with the business, are far more important
in determining product success.
2.1.3 Quality of execution
High quality of execution is called out explicitly in critical success factors for a
good NPD process and implicitly in the four internally focused critical success factors for
projects or products themselves. It is consequently important to spend a bit more time to
identify how firms can ensure high quality of execution in the projects they undertake.
Cooper suggests that high quality of execution can be obtained by making sure that six
criteria are met. First and foremost, quality is ensured by having quality control
checkpoints in a gated NPD process. Checkpoints are only as good as those controlling
them, however, so we must know who the gatekeepers are. The intent of gate reviews is
to give a green light to projects which meet the firm's criteria for moving forwards, while
making sure that projects which should not proceed are killed. Thus gatekeepers must
have the authority to approve resources for the next phase of a project and must be able to
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understand the impact of project approval across the firm. For this reason, gatekeepers
are usually members of the leadership team (criterion #2), preferably from multiple
functions in the organization. This leadership team should use clear and objective
metrics (criterion #3) at each gate against which all projects may be independently
assessed. The criteria should be defined such that they are universal to all projects,
eliminating a tendency to adapt criteria for individual projects. Likewise, specific
activities and tasks are built into the process at each stage, again independent of project or
product (criterion #4), to ensure that key deliverables are met for each stage (criterion
#5). If the above criteria are met, the firm should be able to exit the gate review with a
clear understanding of what was accomplished in the last phase, and a clear
understanding of what is needed in the next phase. This in turn should help the firm to
predict what resources are needed for the next phase and how these resources should be
allocated. The final criterion (#6) to ensure high quality of execution is that the resulting
resource allocation method at gate reviews must be effective, so that project teams may
continue on to the next phase as soon as approval is given. These criteria are summarized
in Table 2-3, reproduced from [4].
1 Implement quality control checkpoints (gates)
2 Designate leadership team as gatekeepers
3 Use clear and consistent metrics at the gates (objective & proficient)
4 Define activities, tasks, methods, and best practices built into the stages of the process
5 Specify visible deliverables to the gates
6 Have effective resource allocation method at gates
Table 2-3. Stage-GateTM process elements for high quality of execution, from [4].
2.1.4 Making quality go/kill decisions
Use of go/kill decision points is frequently the weakest element of firms' NPD
processes [3]. Poor evaluation criteria and prioritization processes and the momentum of
a project once it has been started all lead to firms having too many projects in the
pipeline, with inadequate resources to properly execute them all [9]. Ideally, using a
well-defined NPD process and ensuring that projects and products are closely aligned
with the success factors outlined above will produce good decisions at gate checkpoints.
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However, since we have not yet discussed what specific evaluation criteria at checkpoints
might be, it is worthwhile here to briefly look at some "clear and consistent metrics"
which can be used to evaluate projects.
Many firms use scoring methods on a portfolio of projects, in order to determine
which projects will pass to the next phase. Cooper suggests that the gatekeeping team
independently score projects against both "must-meet" and "should-meet" criteria. Must-
meet criteria are a series of "yes/no" criteria to which the gatekeepers must be able to
answer "yes" in order for the project to proceed to the next phase. Should-meet criteria
are criteria for which an answer may be given on a sliding evaluation scale, where certain
characteristics are desirable, but where the absence of a feature or characteristic will not
result in project failure. Thus should-meet criteria are useful for prioritization among a
list of projects, as they can help gatekeepers determine which projects may have the best
probability of future success, while must-meet criteria control whether a project even
makes it into the prioritization phase. As we will see later, prioritizing among projects
at the defense contractor firm level may appear less critical when the firm's own
resources are not being put into play (although prioritization should probably still be
incorporated into initial decisions on which contracts to pursue), but we do believe that
using must-meet criteria is still critical for the defense contractor.
Must-meet criteria are developed by each individual firm as part of their NPD
process, and are likely to be tailored to an individual firm or an industry. Still, it is
possible to identify a few key criteria which will be common to all firms. Cooper
suggests the seven must-meet criteria in Table 2-4 as a starting point for gate reviews in
the first three stages of the Stage-GateTM process. These parallel the success factors
discussed above, in the inclusion of criteria such as strategic alignment, market need,
product advantage, and positive return versus risk. They also add criteria such as an
assessment of technical feasibility and the absence of show-stopper variables. These
criteria become more important as the project moves to later stages, as work done in each
stage eliminates more and more of the uncertainty inherent in a project at inception.
According to one study, the top three criteria used at stage one are market potential,
strategic fit, and technical feasibility, while at stage two they are technical feasibility,
sales objectives, and product performance [9].
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1 Strategic alignment (fits the business strategy)
2 Existence of market need (minimum size)
3 Reasonable likelihood of technical feasibility
4 Product advantage (unique customer benefits)
5 Meets safety, health, environment, and legal policies
6 Positive return vs. risk
7 No show-stoppers (killer variables)
Table 2-4. Example must-meet gate decision criteria for down-selection, reproduced
from [4].
2.2 Summary
We have seen that critical success factors for successful new product development
can, in fact, be defined broadly such that they are applicable to the wide range of
commercial products developed by firms today. First and foremost, it is important to
have an actual process through which product development is managed and funded.
Projects must then be selected according to objective, measurable criteria, and their
progress through the different stages of development must be monitored. At each stage,
project teams should undertake specific activities using best practices. The outcome of
these tasks should be specific deliverables to the next gate review, at which resources
may then be approved and allocated only for projects which should truly move on to the
next stage.
So far, we have seen very few elements which appear directly in conflict with
models of defense funded programs, other than perhaps the idea of a "look-to-the-world"
product. Thus, we are led to believe that implementation of these types of practices in the
defense world should lead to improved new technology development outcomes.
However, implementation of some of these best practices is constrained by the specific
structure of defense contract funded development world. In the next chapter, we will
explore these constraints. We will then suggest adaptations of the commercial best
practices presented here, appropriate to the defense world, in order to come up with a set
of comprehensive defense-relevant best practices which we may use to benchmark
technology development in our case study.
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Chapter 3: Constraints on Use of Commercial Best Practices in a Defense
Contract Environment
Several constraints specific to the contract funded R&D world make
implementation of the commercial best practices reviewed in Chapter 2 challenging or at
least complicated. In this chapter we explore how issues such as disparate funding
sources, short funding cycles, financial incentives, and go/kill decision ambiguity can
constrain implementation of commercial best practices in the defense world.
3.1 Management responsibility for NPD process and product
Best practices identified in Chapter 2 emphasize significant responsibilities on the
part of management in the NPD process. Management is expected to support up front
market and technical work, provide committed resources, implement quality control
checkpoints, and designate members of the leadership team as gatekeepers. In the world
of defense contract funded R&D, this leads to the question of "who is management?" In
other words, who owns the responsibility for the NPD process and the product? Is it the
contract funding agency? Or is it the contractor? How is the defense world different from
the commercial world in this respect?
In the commercial world, Stage-GateTM type processes help commercial
companies to allocate scarce resources appropriately to the product development efforts
with the best probability for commercial success, and to exit from lower performing
opportunities when necessary. A key driver of this model is the fact that the entity
funding new product development is also the entity which will produce the product, and
which will ultimately sell (and profit from) the product. It is thus in the commercial
company's best interest to incorporate manufacturability, reliability, cost, and market
attractiveness assessments early into the new product development process. A firm
which spends time and money up front on investments in process improvements, and thus
in capability, will reap the benefits of these investments in the future [11]. As a single
entity, the commercial firm has a clear incentive to develop and follow a good NPD
process.
In contrast, in the defense contract funded R&D sector, the funding source
changes as a program develops. Funding sources for Basic Research (6.1), Applied
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Research (6.2) and Advanced Technology Development (6.3) may not be the same, and
the final procurement customer is usually different. For example, initial exploration may
be funded through an agency such as Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), a later system demonstration may be funded through the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL) and a final system might be procured by the Air Force. In the current
procurement structure, funding for manufacturing risk assessment, mitigation and
capability development are also explicitly left to the later stages of product development
and early stages of production. Cost and manufacturing technology are in general not
recognized to be part of the core program of the Science and Technology (S&T)
community [12].
Short funding cycles add to the challenges of funding source diversity. Funding is
allocated for periods on the order of one to a few years, so that each R&D phase must be
authorized individually. While this provides necessary oversight and gating capability in
one respect, it is also recognized by the GAO that "the acquisition environment
emphasizes delaying knowledge capture and problem identification since these events
can have a negative influence on obtaining annual program funding" [1]. A contractor
who identifies at an early stage an issue that might only surface later during
environmental testing is believed to be at a disadvantage relative to a contractor who has
not uncovered a future issue, and who thus may have a rosier outlook. This is in contrast
to the commercial world in which early identification of potential problems is more likely
to be rewarded than punished.
Overall, diversity in funding sources has the effect of breaking the end-to-end
connection between a positive final deployed system outcome and upfront work in the
early R&D stages. Each funding entity "owns" its own position in the development
chain, but does not tend to focus on deliverables to the next phase. Although external
organizations such as the GAO continue to call for an integrated end-to-end NPD
approach, in practice today all work is driven solely by the contract in hand. With
limited budget resources, each funding entity has an incentive to only focus on its area of
responsibility, and the defense contractor is legally bound by contract to do only the work
specified in the contract. This pushes firms to work hard to deliver short term results, but
means fewer resources are usually spent on developing capability necessary for long term
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success [11]. External "management" has effectively come to be temporary, associated
with the specific contract in hand. This also splits gates into two parts. Exiting a current
contract or phase successfully does not guarantee entry into the next phase, since a new
proposal must be submitted, often to a new agency.
In this challenging environment, it is even more critical that management internal
to the contracting firm still carry out the best practices of Chapter 2, emphasizing early
market and technical work, providing resources and instituting a quality NPD process.
This is because the contractor will (if successful) be involved in the product from early
R&D stages all the way through to production phases, unlike the funding agencies.
Improvements in performance in the early stages should yield more competitive bids in
the later stages of development, which should help these firms to win the later contracts.
The firm enters a positive reinforcing loop [11]. Conversely, skipping steps at the
beginning will result in overruns and schedule slips which ultimately will degrade the
contractor's reputation, rate structure, and ability to win new contracts. To a large extent,
at least until the defense industry mandates an integrated end-to-end NPD process
through the DoD 5000 series acquisition guidelines, there is an advantage to the
individual defense contracting firm that takes responsibility for making sure a good NPD
process is followed even in the absence of customer pull.
3.2 Organizational structure in the case ofprogram specific development
Having the right organization, structure, and climate for NPD, including an
empowered team with an accountable leader focused on delivering a well-defined
product, can also be a challenge in the defense environment. In a commercial
enterprise, a firm typically develops a product with appeal to a broad range of customers.
Marketing identifies attributes critical to the majority of customers and the product is
developed according to these criteria by a single development team. After the product is
introduced to the market, some customization for specific customers may occur, but the
overall form, fit and function of the product line is retained. By using a broad technology
development approach, the firm matures a technology platform from which several
customer needs may be met. In defense funded R&D, however, the contractor develops a
product for a specific program funded by a specific agency. The same technology may
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be developed in parallel for one or more different government customers, but with
different key criteria, usually with a discrete leadership structure, and sometimes with a
discrete team structure. This is akin to a commercial firm supporting multiple product
development teams each focused on a single customer. While it is still possible to have a
designated cross-functional team with a dedicated team leader for each funded program,
we can see that multiple simultaneous programs will likely stretch skilled resources thin.
It may be difficult to maintain clarity regarding technical leadership across multiple
programs and it may be difficult to maintain clear product definitions when different
customers emphasize different product attributes. Advancing development of a
technology platform within the confines of program-specific funding will clearly be
difficult.
3.3 Implicit market attractiveness and positive returns
The financial structure of defense contracts can also work against following some
NPD best practices. We saw in Chapter 2 that the NPD process should focus on market
orientation and that market attractiveness should be used for project selection and
prioritization. In the commercial world, this usually means that the firm verifies that the
market for a new product is or will be sufficient in size and in willingness to pay so that
the firm can recoup NPD investments and generate profits in the future. For the
commercial firm, the larger the difference between the product revenue and the cost of
goods sold, the larger the firm's profit, so the firm has an incentive to develop high
yielding production processes which efficiently use labor, materials, and capital.
Development program costs also directly hit the firm's bottom line: the more efficiently
R&D dollars are spent, the higher the firm's overall profits. The actions of the
commercial firm affect its profit margin.
In contrast, in the defense realm, profit margins are frequently decoupled from
actual activity or performance, especially within early stage R&D programs. These
programs are usually run on a cost reimbursement or "cost-plus" basis, not on a fixed-
price basis. A "cost-plus" contract reimburses the contractor for program expenses, such
as labor and materials, plus a percentage for overhead, plus a fee designated as profit.
The fee paid can be (1) fixed, irrespective of the final cost of performance, (2) incentive-
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based, paying somewhere between predetermined limits, based on actual results as
compared to initial contractual targets, or (3) determined by the customer based on
performance against pre-established criteria [13]. For all of these, the contractor does
have an incentive to develop processes and capabilities which will allow submission of a
competitive bid. However, once the contract is won, unless the contract is highly
incentivized, the contractor receives little to no benefit from yield improvements or cost
reductions and individual employees working on a contract may see no benefit or reward.
In fact, improving yields or reducing labor content can have the perverse effect of
reducing billable hours and thus reducing the potential value of the contract.
Paradoxically, if work is not completed on time and a contract extension is required, the
firm can even earn a profit on the extension. An overall result of cost-plus contracting is
that many programs are automatically profitable to the contractor, independent of process
or product improvements, and the hurdle of market attractiveness is effectively removed.'
An exception to this "automatic profitability" can occur, though, when a program
requires significant capital investment. In this case, the contractor has two options. In
one option, capital equipment required for the program may be rolled into the cost of the
program, but the equipment is then dedicated to that specific contract and may be
"claimed" by the funding agency at the end of the contract. Alternatively, capital
equipment may be purchased by the contractor, who then has the right to use the
equipment on any contract(s) it may choose, but the costs of the equipment are
depreciated over time by the firm, reducing the firm's net profits. This latter course is
followed when the equipment is used to support work on many different contracts. In
this case, if required capital expenditures are too high, a market may in fact be
unattractive even when operating profits (before depreciation) are guaranteed. Barring an
intentional decision to pursue an unprofitable market and then roll losses back into higher
rates (which will put the firm at a future competitive disadvantage), the firm may be
better off not pursuing the investment.2
It is even argued by some that this is the case for fixed-fee contracts as well, given the regulated nature of
the contracting. If the firm incurs losses on a program, these are rolled up into the next rate calculation
and are passed back to the customer in the form of higher rates on future contracts. Over the long term, in
the words of one defense executive "It's a beautiful business. We can never lose money."
2 It would seem that this would lead to very limited investment in capital intensive new technologies,
especially if payback periods are long, which could ultimately put the country at a disadvantage. To
33
3.4 Weak ownership of go/kill decisions
An outcome of the disparate funding sources, short funding cycles, and built-in
profitability of cost-plus contracts discussed above is that execution of go/kill decisions
in the defense sector is also compromised. The industry structure effectively defers
responsibility for technology down-selection to the diverse funding agencies, which
choose one or more competing bidders at the different stages of development. This
deferral gives defense industry suppliers the incentive to develop a technology as long as
contract R&D funding is available to support it, sometimes without a strategic assessment
against other technologies in their portfolios. Although we would like to believe that
there are two independent potential down-selection funnels available in the defense
environment, in practice it seems that often only one funnel is imperfectly active.
The primary funnel evident in the defense world is at the government level, as the
number of contracts given for a specific program is reduced as the program moves to
more advanced development stages. For example, for a specific program, the
government may award several contracts in the concept development stage. Some of the
contractors participating in this stage will be selected for the next stage, technology
development. A small number, perhaps just one or two, will be selected for system
development and demonstration, and one may win an award for system production and
deployment. This is schematically illustrated in Figure 3-1. Note that in this model,
go/kill decisions involve selection between competing firms, not within firms, and there
is no filter on the program itself once it has been started. In contrast to the commercial
best practices model, DoD does not make "trade-off decisions as to which programs
should be pursued, and more importantly, not pursued" [15]. More programs are started
than are ultimately affordable, but programs are "rarely [prioritized] for funding
purposes" [16]. When budget cuts are required, "senior officials tend to make across-the-
board cuts to all programs rather than make the hard decisions as to which ones to keep
mitigate this, not-for-profit Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) such as MIT
Lincoln Laboratory are charged to "ensure that the government has advanced technologies for defense
systems." FFRDCs operate under the same cost accounting principles as universities, under which
capital expenditures are expensed. The goal of the FFRDC is to "do the most significant work [they] can
do" with an equipment base distributed over multiple programs. FFRDCs do not compete with the
private sector and do not respond to Broad Area Announcements (BAA), though, so once a program is in
the private sector, it remains there [14].
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and which ones to cancel or cut back" [17]. Also, the number of firms at the starting
point in the funnel has dropped. Consolidation in the defense industry has reduced the
number of prime contractors from more than twenty in the mid-1980s to only about six
today [15], so the funnel itself is narrower at the top than the ideal commercial funnel. In
some cases, there is only one contractor who can produce a component, and who can thus
"hold [a program] hostage" [16]. Finally, defense funding is also impacted by the
Congressional appropriations process which can add or strike programs outside of the
recommendations determined by the services, resulting in projects that "may or may not
serve the [DoD]'s interests well" [12]. Overall, these considerations lead to a conclusion
that go/kill decisions on the DoD side exist, but operate imperfectly.
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Figure 3-1. Schematic down selection funnel in defense contracting.
The second funnel which could and should be operating in the defense R&D
world is the funnel internal to a defense contracting firm. It is the firm's responsibility to
decide which programs it should continue to pursue through each stage of development.
To a certain extent, by submitting a bid for a successive stage of a program, the defense
contractor claims to be able to deliver the project success factors discussed in Chapter 2
(see Table 2-2) to the funding agency. A bid for a program signals that management has
committed resources, believes in product superiority, has structured the organization
appropriately, and sees the project as consistent with its core competencies. This claim is
"certified" in many defense contractors through internal gating processes undertaken to
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review bid proposals before they are submitted to the customer, so in some respects, these
decision points are active. On the other hand, with limited program funds available, there
is a strong incentive for defense contractors to submit bids for any successive program
stage for which they are eligible, without significant re-evaluation of the product and
market at each stage. The contractor also wants to maintain workforce continuity, which
again provides an incentive to bid for as many programs as possible, since maintaining
the workforce requires funded contracts. Finally, contracts themselves may also include
"options" for follow-on work to be completed, provided that performance is
demonstrated in early stages. The intent of options is to provide the funding agencies
with better visibility into future costs without commitment while technical performance is
uncertain. Interviews with defense contractor leaders indicate mixed views on the
obligations inherent in options: some claim that options "tie the hands" of the contractor
so that they are not free to decide to discontinue work in an area while others maintain
that the contractor still has this freedom. Options do seem, however, to break part of the
feedback loop which should be present in the NPD process: the intent of a gated process
is to use the output from each step to make sure that product feasibility and market
attractiveness still hold. If progress to the next step can be triggered by activation of an
externally controlled option, this check is inactive.
Overall, the existence of the DoD-side funnel seems to serve to discourage active
project down-selection on the part of the contractor. It is well recognized across all
industries that it is very difficult to kill projects [9]. If there is another organization
outside which may take responsibility, it is tempting for individual firms to promote all
projects and allow the funding agencies to make the go/kill decisions between firms
instead.
3.5 Metrics and gating criteria
We can tell from the conflicts identified above that there are not in fact clear,
objective, and consistent metrics which are used to gate development of new technologies
in the defense sector. We can also see that such metrics should probably come from the
DoD side, to be consistent with funding ownership and down-selection processes.
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To improve performance to cost and schedule milestones, the DoD, the Services,
and other government agencies have in fact recently developed and begun to introduce
gating metrics designed to provide an objective assessment of new product maturity.
These metrics include Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) introduced by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1995, and Engineering and
Manufacturing Readiness Levels (EMRL) developed by the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) in 2001. Most recently, the DoD and specifically the Manufacturing Technology
(ManTech) program developed Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRL) in 2005 as a
uniform metric to use across the Services. Both EMRLs and MRLs are designed to
provide objective metrics against which technology maturity and manufacturing
readiness may be assessed, in parallel with the technical performance metrics provided by
the TRL framework. The simultaneous existence of TRLs, EMRLs, and MRLs
complicates the picture for the defense contractor, though. Which metrics should the
contractor follow? We will explore the three metrics in detail in Chapter 4 to understand
which might be most suitable for a good NPD process and how well they meet the criteria
outlined by Cooper.
3.6 Summary of constraints
We have seen above that many factors work against implementation of a quality
NPD process in the defense sector. NPD process continuity is disrupted by the presence
of multiple funding entities and short funding cycles. Overall technology platform
development is diverted to instead develop features specific to individual programs,
which can degrade clarity around product features and dilute the effectiveness of
development teams and their leaders. Cost-plus financing of early R&D reduces the
"market attractiveness" hurdle and increases the temptation to defer go/kill decisions to
the funding agencies. Competing maturation frameworks have been proposed which may
or may not be sufficient to ensure a quality NPD process. While it is still in the best
interest of the defense contractor to follow a good NPD process in order to ensure quality
product delivery at the end of the development cycle, this is a challenging task. The
defense contractor may be able to align its interests with those of the customer by using
some of the new readiness levels under development, which may serve as appropriate
gating mechanisms, but we expect from our analysis here that certain best practices will
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need to be maintained by the defense contractor in addition to the practices which may
become mandated by the DoD.
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Chapter 4: Government Gating Methods: Readiness Level Metrics
We saw in Chapter 2 that good NPD processes include decision gates through
which projects must pass in successive stages of development. Individual commercial
firms frequently develop their own gate criteria specific to their industry or product. In
other cases, industry groups develop criteria which are used across multiple firms to
certify performance criteria to particular levels. Within the defense industry, a need was
recognized in recent decades for standardized process improvement approaches in order
to address issues of escalating costs and quality issues in several areas; several different
programs have been developed to address this. For example, for systems engineering and
software development, the DoD sponsored the development of the Capability Maturity
Model® Integration (CMMI) framework. For technology hardware development, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) formalized the Technology
Readiness Level (TRL) framework in 1995 and this was subsequently adopted for DoD
programs. Finding that TRLs did not adequately address design for manufacturability,
design to cost, yield, supply chain, and other production concerns, though, the DoD
revised its own acquisition policy and also gave authority to the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) to develop independent guidance for missile defense systems [18]. The MDA
developed Engineering Manufacturing Readiness Levels (EMRL) in 2001. In only the
past few years, the DoD and specifically the ManTech program have also developed
Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRL) as a uniform metric to use across the Services.
In this chapter, we examine the three hardware-specific metrics, TRLs, EMRLs,
and MRLs to see how well these meet the criteria for good process gates outlined by
Cooper. We use this analysis to see whether any given readiness level metric (generally
xRL) can be used as a surrogate for a good NPD process gate in the defense industry.
Are criteria for the readiness levels clear, consistent, and objective? Do they define
activities, tasks, methods and best practices for the various stages of the process? Do
they specify visible deliverables at each milestone? Finally, do they incorporate general
must-meet requirements common to successful products?
We find from our analysis that EMRL and MRL metrics both incorporate many,
albeit not all, of the features of good gating processes in the commercial world. In
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general, the EMRL and MRL frameworks provide clear objective criteria which can be
used to judge technical progress, while the TRL framework is in general insufficient to
guarantee good product outcomes, as had been noted by the DoD. Using the EMRL or
MRL framework for technology development programs is therefore recommended over
simply using TRLs, with the choice of metric based on the end customer until the two
metrics are consolidated. We do also find, though, that the xRL metrics are in general
incomplete according to the criteria of Cooper. They fit the mold of the checklist-type
first generation NPD processes followed by commercial firms in the 1960s but do not yet
incorporate many of the "softer" criteria also deemed critical for good NPD processes.
Thus for our case-study analysis of hardware component development, we will
recommend evaluation based both on the MRL metrics and the inwardly controlled
success elements such as organizational structure, strategic fit, and leveraging of core
competencies discussed in Chapter 2.
4.1 Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) - NASA
Technology Readiness Levels were formalized by NASA in 1995 to provide "a
systematic metric/measurement system that supports assessments of the maturity of a
particular technology and the consistent comparison of maturity between different types
of technology" [5]. Technology readiness was divided into nine levels, starting with
observation of basic principles and ending with "flight proof' of a system in a successful
mission operation. A summary of TRL definitions, excerpted from [5], is provided in
Table 4-1. Although TRLs were not directly developed for the defense environment,
they have in fact been commonly used as a metric to measure technical capability on
defense programs. Since 2001, TRLs were the "preferred approach for all new DoD
programs" [6]. We will see below, though, that TRLs are focused primarily on
performance of a single technology or system, and do not address many issues needed to
produce a product in quantities larger than one.
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TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported
TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof-of-
concept
TRL 4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment
TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment
(ground or space)
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in a space environment
TRL 8 Actual system completed and "flight qualified" through test and demonstration
I (ground or space)
TRL 9 Actual system "flight proven" through successful mission operations
Table 4-1. Technology Readiness Levels, excerpted from [5].
Overall, TRLs are very generally defined by the level of complexity of the
hardware (component, subsystem, or system) and the environment in which it is operated
(laboratory, relevant environment, or space). They do not, however, specify clear
criteria, tasks, or metrics. For example, TRL 5 is met when a component and/or a
breadboard is "validated in a relevant environment" but it is not readily apparent what
either validation or relevant environment mean. The more detailed explanation of TRL5
(see Table 4-2) provides a descriptive example of testing, but again does not specify
deliverables which could automatically be applied to another product.
TRL 5: Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
"At this, the fidelity of the component and/or breadboard being tested has to increase
significantly. The basic technological elements must be integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the total applications (component-level, sub-system
level, or system-level) can be tested in a 'simulated' or somewhat realistic environment.
From one to several new technologies might be involved in the demonstration. For
example, a new type of solar photovoltaic material promising higher efficiencies would at
this level be used in an actual fabricated solar array 'blanket' that would be integrated
with power supplies, supporting structure, etc., and tested in a thermal vacuum chamber
with solar simulation capability."
Table 4-2. Definition of TRL 5, excerpted from [5].
TRL metrics are also very limited in terms of how far out they look from
technical performance of a single device. The metrics do not include any assessment of
how the technology compares to competing products (is it superior and differentiated?),
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whether it can be produced by the supplier (does it leverage core competencies?), or
whether it can be produced in a cost-effective manner (what is the cost and is there a
positive return?). Thus while TRL metrics may serve to evaluate performance of a
technology, they cannot be used to sufficiently evaluate a product based on the
technology nor how well such a product can be transitioned into production. Finally,
TRL metrics do not identify the gatekeepers, so it is unclear who controls progress
through the levels. What entity certifies that a component has reached TRL5?
These and other limitations of TRLs as gating mechanisms for product
development were key drivers for the development of both EMRLs and MRLs. The TRL
metrics by themselves are insufficient to ensure that contractors follow commercial best
practices in developing defense products.
4.2 Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness Levels (EMRLs) - MDA
The MDA supported development of Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness
Levels in 2001 to address "Production Readiness" of a technology, to supplement the
"Technology Readiness" assessment of the TRL metrics [6]. Specifically, EMRLs were
designed to address the problem that "there is nothing in the description of [any TRL] ...
that requires that the technology be producible, reliable, and affordable". EMRLs were
intended to be integrated with TRL assessments, in particular with later stage
development programs. Five EMRL stages were defined (EMRL 1 through EMRL 5),
starting after a technology has met TRL 4 or TRL 5, component or breadboard validation
in a laboratory or relevant environment. Programs enter EMRL 1 at the point designated
in the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) framework as Capability Knowledge Point
(CKP) 1, or Milestone B. Figure 4-1 shows how EMRL stages fit into the DAS
framework.
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Figure 4-1. Integration of EMRLs into the Defense Acquisition Systems framework,
from [20].
The EMRL methodology has evolved since 2001 to include highly quantitative
metrics for design readiness and manufacturing readiness for each step in the EMRL
process. For example, at EMRL 1 at least 50% of the physical and functional interfaces
must be defined and at least 75% of the major subsystems representing about 80% of cost
must meet the requirements of CKP 2 (Design Readiness Review) (see Table 4-3 for the
complete definition of EMRL 1). Similar criteria are defined for the more advanced
EMRLs. These criteria can be considered clear, consistent, and objective and to a large
extent they do define activities, tasks, and methods for the process, so they meet many of
the criteria of good NPD gates. A Missile Defense Agency EMRL implementation guide
also indicates that gatekeepers have been at least considered within the EMRL process:
although certification authorities are not identified for the EMRL assessments, they are
specified for the TRL hardware assessments included in the EMRL assessments (see
Table 4-4) [19]. Finally, the EMRL process introduces the key concept of precedence
relationships in the work breakdown structure. Drilling down through the layers of
system, sub-system, and component, each entity is required to be at an EMRL that
exceeds the EMRL of the layer of the system in which it resides. These precedence
relationships are designed to avoid the problems of technology development occurring
concurrent with product development. If a new system is in development, the subsystems
are expected to already be in low rate initial production (LRIP) and components are
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expected to be in full rate production (FRP), so that the new system is not held hostage to
an unproven component technology. Effective precedence relations are illustrated
schematically in Figure 4-2. The implications of including an immature core component
in a system are also shown.
EMRL 1: "System, component or item validation in laboratory environment or initial
relevant engineering application/breadboard, brassboard development."
"System, component or item validation in initial relevant engineering application and
ready to enter Development Phase. Technologies must have matured to at least
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 4 or 5. Satisfying exit criteria metrics for Capability
Knowledge Point (CKP) 1 (Milestone B) and successful completion of system
Preliminary Design Review (PDR) indicates readiness for the Product Development
Phase.
This is the initial level of engineering and manufacturing readiness. Technologies must
have matured to at least TRL 4 or 5. At this point all system engineering/design
requirements defined and 50% validated. Component physical and functional interfaces
50% defined at system level. Manufacturing processes and system level integration
demonstrated. 75% of major subsystems representing approximately 80% of cost meet
requirements of CKP2. Overall quality and reliability levels and key characteristics
identified and established for 50% of the system. Failure modes effects and criticality
analysis required for all levels. Safety assessment plan initiated. Design to Cost goals
established."
Table 4-3. EMRL 1 Definition, excerpted from [20].
Level Certification Authority
TRL 1 Principal Investigator (PI)
TRL 2 - 3 PI+ Funding Agency Project Sponsor
TRL 4 - 6 Deputy(ies) external to the Project
TRL 7 - 9 Cognizant Development Deputy in conjunction with SE
Table 4-4. TRL certification authorities defined within the MRL framework.
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Figure 4-2. Illustration of maturity precedence relations, adapted from [20].
We can see from these characteristics that the EMRL framework is fairly well
designed as a set of NPD gates, when compared with Cooper's criteria, and EMRL
assessments are in fact being implemented by the MDA. We do note, however, a few
limitations to the EMRL model, which are of concern. Our first reservation is that
EMRL 1 is reached in parallel with Milestone B, the end of Technology Development, so
it does not truly integrate manufacturing readiness with the early product R&D design
phase during which most product costs are determined. Second, although the EMRL
framework does provide much more objective criteria than the TRL framework, it runs a
risk of going too far in the direction of checklists more representative of early NPD
processes. By 2006, the EMRL evaluation criteria had grown to include 61 Program
Maturity factors, and 353 Criteria and Metrics [20] and a web-based software tool was
being developed for EMRLs. The developer clarified that criteria may be shortened or
tailored for particular applications and that the detailed criteria are "intended for people
with less experience" [21], but the risk remains that project teams may see the extensive
list of criteria as bureaucratic without adding value. In the view of one senior defense
scientist, such processes operate on "the fundamental tenet that people are not smart
enough to do the design" and they "slow productivity to a trickle." Although this is
surely not the intent of the detailed criteria, it is important to recognize that the EMRL
45
L
requirements may be perceived as demonstrating a lack of respect for the people counted
on to execute the EMRL process, and this perception may undermine EMRL efficacy.
4.3 Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs) - DoD
Manufacturing Readiness Levels provide an alternative DoD metric which is also
designed to assess hardware maturity. MRLs were developed and introduced after
EMRLs but build significantly on the material introduced by the EMRL framework. As
of mid-2006 the MRL framework was about 90-95% complete, and was being strongly
supported within the DoD and in particular within the Man Tech division. Directives
were issued in 2005 to carry out Manufacturing Readiness Assessments (MRAs) within
programs overseen by the AFRL [22]. Similar assessments are being carried out within
the Army Research Laboratory (ARL). The Defense Science Board Task Force on the
Manufacturing Technology Program also recommended in 2006 that MRLs be
incorporated into the DoD 5000 series acquisition regulations as a program evaluation
requirement [12]. This proposal reportedly has Congressional support [7] and it is
expected that this change to the 5000 series regulations will occur.
MRLs are designed to evaluate the "manufacturing readiness" of a product,
supplementing the existing TRL framework [7]. The primary goal is to enable rapid,
affordable technology transitions to acquisition programs. MRLs seek to answer
underlying questions not addressed by the TRL framework, such as reproducibility of
technical performance, product cost, and materials availability. Recognizing that most
technologies are developed by highly skilled scientists, MRLs raise the issue "Can
[devices] be made in a production environment by someone without a Ph.D.?" In
answer to the question of many developers as to whether "production" and
"reproducibility" are really relevant in often low-volume defense products, MRLs also
specifically target performance reproducibility "in items 2 - 1000." By the time the
I0001h item is produced, the cumulative volume produced has doubled almost 10 times.
There is in fact the most opportunity for moving down the learning curve in the early
stages of production.
To ensure cost effective technology transitions, MRLs establish a structure which
directly parallels the nine-level TRL structure, from as early as TRL 3. Figure 4-3 shows
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the alignment of MRLs with TRLs and with the DAS milestones. MRL evaluations start
much earlier than EMRL assessments, including four assessments prior to Milestone B
(EMRL 1). MRL proponents emphasize that early intervention is critical, since about
85% of costs can be locked in by Milestone B [7]. For this reason, in fact, pilot MRL
programs today are all Advanced Technology Demonstrators (ATDs), which the AFRL
hopes to take from MRL 3 through MRL 5 or ideally MRL 6 [24].
Relationship to System Acquisition Milestones
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Figure 4-3. MRL relationships, reproduced from [7].
4.3.1 MRL definitions
The MRL framework is actively evolving today as pilot programs are run, so one
challenge is finding specific MRL definitions. The best available sources appear to be an
electronic document repository actively maintained and updated within the Defense
Acquisition University (DAU) web site (acc.dau.mil) and various presentations from
members of the AFRL Man Tech Division. We review the overview of the MRL metrics
from the DAU website below. We then provide detailed criteria for the first few MRL
gates, which are most relevant to our goal of identifying appropriate gating criteria for
early stage defense contract funded R&D programs, using fairly straightforward lists
covering MRL 3 through MRL 6 from the AFRL Man Tech program. 3
3 Much more extensive electronic checklists are also available through the acc.dau.mil website. Like the 61
Program Maturity factors and 353 Criteria and Metrics of the EMRL software tool, though, these detailed
checklists may have too many "boxes to check" in them. There is a risk that the fundamental intent (and
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The DAU website includes a detailed matrix of MRL requirements outlining nine
primary threads with specific criteria at each MRL. Threads include Technology &
Industrial Base, Design, Materials, Cost & Funding, Process Capability & Control,
Quality Management, Manufacturing Personnel, Facilities, and Manufacturing
Management. Each thread is then broken down into more detailed areas. For example,
the Design thread addresses Producibility, Form, Fit, & Function, Unique Components,
and Key Characteristics. The Materials thread addresses Maturity, Availability, Sources,
and Special Handling (including safety and hazardous materials issues). The Process
Capability & Control thread addresses Production Line Modeling & Simulation,
Manufacturing Process Maturity, Manufacturing Technology Initiatives, and Process
Yields and Rates. Each sub-thread then has specific requirements which become
progressively more rigorous as MRLs advance. For example, within Design: Key
Characteristics, Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) are identified at MRL 4, allocated
at the component level at MRL 5, and tolerances are established at MRL 6. In parallel,
the Process Capability and Control: Process Yields and Rates thread requires yield
assessments on similar processes at MRL 4, identification of yield/rate issues and plans
for improvement at MRL 5, and evaluation of yields in a production representative
environment at MRL 6. On the supply chain side, the Materials: Sources thread requires
identification of sole/single/foreign source vendors at MRL 4, planning to minimize
sole/single/foreign source vendors at MRL 5, and justification for any remaining
sole/single/foreign sources at MRL 6; sourcing stability is assessed and monitored from
MRL 7 through MRL 10.4 More details within each level are explored below.
4.3.1.1 MRL 3 - Identification of Manufacturing Concepts
Table 4-5 lists three fundamental requirements for certification at MRL 3, the
simplest gate. The primary requirements are identification and documentation, all of
which should be fairly straightforward to achieve, provided that the program also meets
TRL 3. MRL 3 also starts to identify, though, areas which may contribute to difficulty or
benefits) of the MRL framework may be obscured by the extensive detail in these documents, so we have
instead focused here on the more general questionnaires being actively used today.
4 A takeaway from the Materials section is also the reminder that prime contractors are responsible for
ensuring that their suppliers also meet MRL criteria. The prime contractor is responsible for its own
materials and anything it sources externally.
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cost later, by highlighting areas which will need "new or significantly different
resources."
MANUFACTURING READINESS LEVEL 3
TRL 3 - Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of
concept.
Applied Research - Demonstration of technology functionality for potential applications.
MRL 3 - Manufacturing Concepts Identified
1. Identify the high-level manufacturing flow for producing new technology
2. Identify materials / resources needed
3. Highlight key areas which will require new or significantly different
manufacturing capability or resources
Table 4-5. Criteria for MRL 3, reproduced from [23].
4.3.1.2 MRL 4 - Identification of Manufacturing Processes
MRL 4 should occur with TRL 4, when performance has been validated in a
laboratory environment. At this point, more detail on the processing side is required,
including planning for process integration, resources, requirements, and costs. Table 4-6
provides a set of detailed questions to be answered in six primary areas. At MRL 4
planning is begun for future work, including a roadmap and cost projections, as it
becomes more likely that the technology will be successful.
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MANUFACTURING READINESS LEVEL 4
TRL 4 - Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment
Applied Research - Demonstration and/or breadboard validation in laboratory
environment
MRL 4 - Identify the key manufacturing processes
1. Manufacturing flow concept detailed:
a. What are the processing steps?
b. Any processing steps new, different, or specialized?
c. What are the manufacturing capabilities requirements?
d. Capture detailed flow of new processing
e. Identify manufacturing runs for critical processes
2. Process integration planning
a. Identify interactions between independent processes
3. Resources required: capabilities, facilities, expertise, materials?
a. Are there new resources required beyond current industrial base?
i. Identify new processing resources
ii. Identify new materials required
iii. What are the requirements for new / different resources?
4. Identify key design requirements / key design characteristics
5. Identify the high-level manufacturing flow of the system level or major sub-
system (integration of the new technology)
a. Identify who could potentially produce a system that integrates the new
technology
6. Roadmap
a. Develop plan showing progression from MRL 4 through MRL 6
b. Identify critical milestone decision points for insertion systems
c. Show planned MRL maturity in relationship to insertion system
milestones
d. Cost targets / drivers identified
Table 4-6. Criteria for MRL 4, reproduced from [23].
4.3.1.3 MRL 5 - Manufacturing Process Development
MRL 5 begins the focus on manufacturing process development, once the
technology has been demonstrated to meet performance requirements in a relevant
environment (see Table 4-7). The intent of MRL 5 is to start process development so that
future production of the device or system will be successful. MRL 5 thus introduces the
concepts of process capability and control, and requires a test plan for manufacturing
runs. MRL 5 also introduces some of the less technical issues in Cooper's criteria, such
as requiring a viable preliminary business plan and a make versus buy (make/buy)
analysis.
50
MANUFACTURING READINESS LEVEL 5
TRL 5 - Component and/or Breadboard validation in relevant environment
Advanced Technology Demonstration - Demonstration in a high-fidelity hardware-in-the-
loop facility
MRL 5 - Manufacturing processes development
1. Technology prime planning
a. Process capability
i. Establish process capability requirements
ii. Document definition of the control subject
1. Select measurement units
2. Identify key process input variables
iii. Define boundary values
b. Process control
i. Identify factors contributing to process variation
c. Update plans for manufacturing runs of critical processes
d. Update plans for manufacturing runs to demonstrate process interaction
e. Review of technology manufacturing concepts and key processes
f. Value stream map
g. Make / buy trade-offs
h. Preliminary Business plan / viability
i. Facilities
ii. Personnel
iii. Tooling
iv. Materials
v. Cost and schedule projections
i. Demonstrate technology capability to produce prototype item
2. Roadmap update
a. Process capability and control goals documented
b. Add cost projections for technology to MRL milestones
c. Update key design requirements / key design characteristics
Table 4-7. Criteria for MRL 5, reproduced from [23].
4.3.1.4 MRL 6 - Demonstration of critical manufacturing processes
MRL 6 requires demonstration of critical manufacturing processes and
demonstration of baseline process control by the time the system or subsystem
performance is validated in a relevant environment (see Table 4-8). With this
information, yield goals can be established and the business plan can be updated to
include appropriate cost and schedule projections.
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MANUFACTURING READINESS LEVEL 6
TRL 6 - System / subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment
Advanced Technology Demonstration - Demonstration of actualflight ready hardware
set in a high-fidelity hardware in the loop facility under expected levels of shock,
vibration, altitude, and temperature
MRL 6 - Critical Manufacturing Processes Demonstrated
1. Process capability and control baselined for critical steps
a. Manufacturing runs of critical processes executed
i. Analyze process
1. Failure modes and effects analysis
ii. Improve and control
iii. Yield goals reconciled with business plan costs and schedules
2. Plans for manufacturing process integration executed
a. Critical process interactions run / demonstrated
3. Production line development
a. Implementation planning completed
i. Lean production plan developed
ii. Investment requirements identified
4. Reconciled with business plan costs and schedules
5. Roadmap update
a. Process capability and control goals confirmed
b. Cost projections for technology updated
c. Key design requirements / key design characteristics updated
d. Business plans updates
Table 4-8. Criteria for MRL 6, reproduced from [23].
4.3.2 MRL evaluation
We can see from the specifications for MRL 3 - 6 that the MRL framework does
in general meet many of the criteria required for good NPD gates. Criteria for each MRL
are clear, consistent, and objective, and visible deliverables are specified at each level.
Metrics are not quite as directly quantified as the EMRL metrics, in that MRLs do not
specify a percentage of drawings to be complete, but key issues such as process
capability and control are addressed. MRLs also emphasize costs and viable business
plans much earlier in the process than for EMRLs. EMRL 1 occurs at the same point,
Milestone B, as MRL 6. By incorporating four gating points up to and including MRL 6,
the MRL framework gives visibility into possible future issues before EMRL 1. Finally,
of the three frameworks, the MRL framework appears to have the broadest view of a
program, looking at how the program fits within the industrial base, requiring a make/buy
evaluation, and considering issues such as sole/foreign/single sourcing. By including not
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only the two dimensions of product and process, but supply chain as well, the MRL
framework starts to approximate a three-dimensional concurrent engineering (3-DCE)
approach, the use of which can provide firms with significant competitive advantage [25].
Effectively the MRL framework seeks to require that firms develop capability in multiple
dimensions, so that over the long run they may "work smarter" [11].
Comparing the MRL criteria to the best practices decision criteria identified by
Cooper, we see that the MRL framework does address many of the must-meet criteria.
Technical feasibility is verified through the parallel TRL requirements. Market need and
positive returns are somewhat covered by the business plan requirements at MRL 5
(although this may not be early enough in the process for the contractor). Safety, health,
environment, and legal requirements are covered through much of the materials and
manufacturing planning. Show stoppers and potential killer variables are explored
through identification of critical processes, interactions between processes, and sourcing
verification. Leveraging of core competencies could possibly be said to be indirectly
treated through investigation of the industrial base. On the other hand, MRLs do not
explicitly address strategic alignment, product advantage, or organizational structure, all
of which are also required for success. MRL proponents themselves clarify that "MRLs
are not designed to be go/no-go gates, but rather to assist leaders in making informed risk
decisions at Milestone reviews" [7]. It will thus likely still be in the contractor's best
interest to evaluate capabilities against other metrics in addition to MRL criteria.
4.4 Choosing a readiness level metric
Our review of the three hardware-specific DoD readiness level metrics has shown
that either EMRL or MRL metrics, but not TRL metrics alone, could likely be used as
partial gating criteria for NPD in the defense industry. In order to choose which one of
these is preferable, for our purposes, we consider a few more criteria, notably the voice of
the customer and the stage of technology development.
We saw in Chapter 2 that good NPD processes emphasize market orientation and
"the voice of the customer." We saw in Chapter 3 that many of the gating decisions in
the defense industry, particularly go/kill decisions, are also made by the customer, not the
contracting firm. It follows from these two considerations that the contractor should
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prepare for gate reviews according to criteria which are set by the customer. Thus the
choice between EMRL and MRL metrics today to a large extent comes down to the
primary source of contract funding. For firms with significant investments from the
MDA, it will make most sense to follow development steps consistent with EMRL
metrics. Firms with significant DoD funding from AFRL or ARL will likely want to
follow MRL metrics. In both cases, firms have an incentive to pro-actively prepare for
EMRLs or MRLs becoming part of their contractual obligations. In fact, firms likely
have an incentive to prepare for a composite of the two metrics to be instituted. It is
expected that eventually the two programs will be reconciled into a single structure. This
ultimate integration is evidenced by frequent use of EMRL examples in some areas of the
MRL implementation guide, where the development of the equivalent MRL step (for
example subsystem/component roll-up charts) lags EMRL development [26]. The most
likely integration will merge the two processes where they are similar and will
incorporate benefits from each that do not have a parallel in the other. For example, since
the early stages of the MRL process (MRL 3 through MRL 6) are not as fully developed
in the EMRL process, these would be expected to be retained. Likewise, since the EMRL
framework has more explicit requirements for maturity precedence relations and has a
more developed visualization metric (rollup charting), these might be expected to survive
in the final system.
Our case study is focused on an optical component which has been developed on
contract R&D funds from both DARPA and AFRL. The AFRL is currently
implementing MRLs on ATD programs and has plans to implement these on an
additional 16 programs in the near future. In fact, the "AF ManTech office is
establishing the capability to conduct manufacturing readiness assessments for all
hardware-intensive AFRL ATDs" [7]. All of these programs will be at levels under
MRL 6. The 16 programs on the current list include two which could incorporate the
technology in our case study, which today is at approximately TRL 3. Thus for our
purposes, it is most appropriate to apply the MRL methodology, both for customer
satisfaction and due to the early stage technology maturity. As an added carrot, AFRL
Man Tech staff confirmed that ATD programs which undergo MRL evaluations become
candidates for Man Tech funding. Although DoD Man Tech programs represent less
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than 0.5% of DoD research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) budget, in a
competitive funding environment, more potential sources of funding are always desirable.
A typical small Man Tech program might provide $ 1M for one year, while a larger
program might provide $15M over four years. We will see in our case study that this
level of funding could help to establish market attractiveness.
4.5 Summary of defense readiness level metrics
We have seen that the defense acquisition environment appears to be changing
today to formally incorporate best practices for manufacturing readiness in addition to its
standard focus on technology capability. The older TRL metrics are insufficient by
themselves to serve as sufficient gating criteria. The EMRL and MRL metrics being
developed by the MDA and the DoD are much better aligned with commercial best
practices. They incorporate manufacturing design into the early stages of development
where costs can be impacted the most, and they do this through the use of clear objective
criteria. It is expected that one or both of these metrics will soon be incorporated
formally into defense acquisition regulations. Defense contractors who prepare for this
change are likely to come out ahead in development of upcoming DoD systems, and
those who do this, plus integrate other "softer" commercial best practices are likely to do
best.
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Chapter 5: Application of Best Practices: Case Study Analysis
With a set of best practices and gating metrics applicable to the defense industry
now in hand, we will now see how these practices and metrics might be applied to a
current R&D program funded by defense contracts at a major U. S. defense contractor. A
technology transition study of an optical component was carried out as part of an MIT
Leaders for Manufacturing (LFM) internship with an LFM partner company. The
internship spanned six and a half months, from June 2006 through December 2006. The
primary objective of the internship was to provide recommendations to the firm's
divisional management on how to bring up production capabilities for the device under
development. These recommendations were to address questions including if, how, when
and where the firm should make capital investments to support production capabilities,
and what best practices the firm should follow in order to ensure a successful new
product transition. The best practices frameworks presented in Chapters 2 to 4 were
studied to find a set of metrics appropriate to the defense industry, both for this program
and more generally for other technologies that the contractor might develop in the future.
In the next two chapters we use the frameworks developed in previous chapters to
both understand the state of the device development today and to provide the firm with
recommendations for the future. Background information is first provided to position the
technology and the development group within the organization and the changing defense
environment. In this chapter, we then explore non-technical ("soft") aspects of the NPD
project including strategic fit, organizational structure, financial options, and competitive
position. To understand the business and project environment, we review perceived
commitment levels from management and the government, and the current organizational
structure. To understand fit, we explore how the proposals for new capital expenditures
support the firm's strategy and how they fit with the firm's core competencies. For
finances, we summarize results from financial models for four proposed investment
scenarios, including best- and worst-case scenarios. Finally, we review the competitive
component landscape.
In the next chapter, technical Manufacturing Readiness Assessments (MRAs,
"hard" criteria) are presented for three elements of the component: one externally
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sourced material and two internally sourced processes. Because MRLs are new and
contracts do not yet require compliance with MRL requirements, it is not expected that
the component elements will be at a specific MRL. The MRAs serve broadly to identify
areas for focus in future contracts.
Taken together, the results of the "soft" and "hard" evaluations were used to
provide an ensemble recommendation for future steps in program development. Because
of the proprietary nature of the details of the study, much of the specific data in both
evaluations has been modified in this work to provide representative illustrations. Data
for the study was gathered through 6.5 months of on-site work for the contractor,
including interviews, surveys, site-visits, and review of existing company documentation
and processing records.
5.1 Background
The device under development is an optical component first conceived of by
scientists in the R&D division of the firm in the mid-1980s. The device can be used in
applications including free-space optical communications and high energy laser delivery,
all of which have been maturing in concurrent defense programs for a few decades. It
relies on a liquid crystal optical element which is controlled by complex electronic
circuits. As a liquid-crystal-based device, the component uses technology and processes
common to the flat-panel and liquid crystal display (LCD) industries. These include
fabrication methods and equipment common to the semiconductor business, such as
photolithography and thin film deposition technologies. Like both LCDs and
semiconductors, the devices require fabrication in a clean room.
Investments in the technology were funded in initial years through corporate
R&D dollars and in later years through various government contracts, including funding
from DARPA and AFRL. The development team achieved several "firsts" in technology
development under these contracts, including demonstrating record device size at one or
more times. The group or its members also received various internal and external
technology and publication awards.
Recent years brought several changes to the contractor and to the development
team which are relevant for our study. The most fundamental change was the dissolution
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of the corporate R&D division several years ago. This restructuring organizationally
realigned former R&D groups under specific business divisions and physically relocated
groups when the original corporate R&D site was closed. At this time, the technology
was identified as a potential enabler for laser communications, a new growth area being
driven by the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) Communications vision of the Under
Secretary of Defense. As funding opportunities opened up in the TSAT area, the
component group was realigned under a communications-focused business unit of the
firm and was relocated to available clean-room space rented from another business
division, about an hour's drive from the regional headquarters of the parent
communications business unit. For clarity below, this clean-room location is referred to
as Site A and the regional headquarters location for the communications business unit is
referred to as Site C. Most of the R&D group was physically located at Site A, while
business division management, program management, and systems integration staff were
located at Site C. The R&D group in Site A received government contracts sufficient to
make it nominally self-supporting in 2003 and 2004, excluding the capital outlays
required to transfer the clean room equipment. More recently, though, many factors
have made the funding environment more difficult. These include re-allocation (and
reduction) of government funds across the board due to the expenses of the ongoing war
in Iraq and an overall slippage of the TSAT program. The initial champion of the TSAT
program has also left the DoD, and proponents of existing satellite communications
programs (MilStar) are lobbying for alternate approaches which may further reduce the
size of available programs in the laser communications space. In 2006, the R&D team
was actively working on two contracts, and the next phase of a third expected contract
had been indefinitely postponed.
In this challenging environment, the firm needed to make some key decisions,
both for the long and short term. Looking out a few years, and assuming continued
success in device development, the firm wanted to decide at what location to enter into
production and where capital investments should be made. Complicating the issue was a
request for capital equipment expenditures at Site A in the short term to upgrade or
replace older equipment which the development team had been using for two decades.
At the outset of the internship, it had largely been assumed that expenditures could and
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would be made in two locations: the common view was that investments would be made
to grow and upgrade the capabilities of the existing R&D group at Site A, but that
investments for manufacturing at a product level would probably occur in a different
facility already dedicated to component manufacturing. This second facility is referred to
below as Site B. In this hypothesis, personnel at Site B would be responsible for
producing product while the R&D group at Site A would continue to develop next
generation devices. In the initial assumptions, it was also assumed that Site B, with a
stand-alone profit and loss statement, would foot the bill for any capital expenditures
required to give it all the technology capabilities needed for fabrication of this particular
component. One justification for transferring production to Site B was that Site B
already had some existing processing equipment for other products with some technical
capabilities that exceeded the capability of the existing equipment at Site A.
5.2 Commitment and organizational structure
New product development efforts work best when an assigned team of players
with a clearly accountable leader are supported in their NPD efforts by solid
commitments from management, as discussed in Chapter 2. To understand how well the
existing organizational structure for this component met these criteria, we surveyed
employees in Sites A, B, and C with connections to device development. On-line surveys
were completed by 24 of 36 invitees (67%) for a first survey and by 19 of 35 invitees
(54%) for a second survey run a few months later: these high response rates are
5indicative in and of themselves of a high level of commitment to the program.
Survey results did indeed confirm strong commitment and motivation among
employees. 87% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "I am
motivated to do my best to support [device] development efforts." Motivation was
uniform across all locations, with only one employee dissenting. Respondents also
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "I personally have a vested professional
interest in the success of the [device]" at a 79% rate. Thus the firm had in place a
committed team of players dedicated to making the product successful.
5 A rule of thumb is that typical survey response rates are around 30%, so both of these response rates are
considered quite successful.
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On the other hand, employees in general felt that commitment and support was
lacking both from firm management and from U. S. government programs. On a one to
five scale (1 = too little, 3 = the right amount, 5 = too much), device R&D support from
firm management was rated only 1.7 on average, and support from U. S. government
programs was rated 2.2 on average. Only a few respondents seemed to believe that
government support slightly exceeded management support, but all were worried about
funding. "Failure to invest" and "program uncertainty" were rated as the top two non-
technical risks to device success. The second survey followed up on the perceived lack
of government support by asking "how well does the firm publicize or advertise device
capabilities?" Only 21% of respondents believed publicity was sufficient, with the
majority (58%) responding "not enough" and an additional 21% responding "way too
little."
Despite these worries, though, there was significant optimism that program and
management support would still warrant a high level of device-related activity in multiple
locations. A series of questions asked staff to predict what level of device-related activity
would be present in a 5-10 year timeframe in seven different processing areas (device
fabrication through system level assembly), either at the current R&D site (Site A) or
elsewhere within the company. Allowed responses started at no activity (0) and moved
up through conceptual design (1), research (2), development (3), new product pilot line
(4), small volume production line (5), and manufacturing (6). The mean predicted
activity level was 4.0 at Site A and 4.3 elsewhere, with maximum expectations of 4.9 at
Site A and 5.8 elsewhere. Respondents thus strongly believed that the firm would be
supporting a pilot line in the current Site A location, as well as production line in either
low or high volume elsewhere in the firm.
These responses together highlight a contradiction between what staff believed
would be the case in the future and the level of support that they felt they had at present.
Best practice is to have a clearly defined project leader who communicates upwards and
downwards, so we wondered what message was being given by program leadership.
Since the component work spanned several different government programs, we needed to
first identify the person responsible for the overall maturation of the component
technology. Since the organization had both business and technical arms, in both
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surveys we asked respondents to name the individual who "owned" the device business
case and the individual who "owned" the device technology development.6 Respondents
were instructed to leave the response blank if they did not know. In the first survey, two
names were given for business ownership: 74% of respondents correctly named the
business unit manager in charge and others named the scientist who had invented the
technology, but who also now had some business development responsibilities. On the
technical development side, four different names were provided, and several respondents
independently filled in the equivalent of "no one is in charge." Of the four people
named, only one thought he was responsible for development, and this was not the same
person deemed responsible by management at Site C. In a detailed look, it was also
noted that 56% of self-identified technical contributors at Site A either left the technical
leader answer blank (an implicit "I don't know") or explicitly wrote in the equivalent of
"no one is in charge." A follow-up survey was run a few months later. Since a few
respondents had indicated that ownership and leadership meant different things to them,
the technical ownership question was split to ask separately "who owns technology
development?" and "who is leading technology development?" to see if this would
provide more consistent responses. Again however, four different names were put forth
for each question (six unique names in total) along with several "no one" and "I don't
know" answers. One person was named as both owning (42%) and leading (32%)
technical development, but again the person deemed responsible by management at
Site C was named only 21% of the time for both questions. Overall these results pointed
to an area in need of improvement, namely the clear designation of a project leader
responsible for maturing the component technology itself.
We concluded from our organizational and leadership analysis that many of the
key attributes needed for successful NPD were present, especially a committed team, but
that there was an opportunity for organizational improvement. Many of the discrepancies
between what was perceived at present and what was expected in the long term are very
6 In the best practices literature, the project leader should be dedicated to only one NPD project (in our case
component development) and should have formal authority to make day-to-day decisions. This means
the appropriate "leader" here is the technology development leader. However, since the culture of this
firm is to somewhat split responsibility between a business unit manager who oversees multiple
technologies, and program teams, we used two separate questions to differentiate between these roles.
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likely linked to the lack of clarity in technical leadership. Without a clearly responsible
technical leader in place, the team did not have a representative to air concerns regarding
funding and publicity to management. Likewise, no one had responsibility to challenge
the assumption that there would be significant investments in the component technology
over the next several years. The physical distance between management in the regional
headquarters at Site C and the satellite clean room at Site A likely also increased the
difficulty of effective communications. Finally, no one had the key responsibility for
ensuring that the technology was maturing as planned, and that the strategy and resource
requirements were consistent with the firm's goals and capabilities.
5.3 Strategic fit and core competencies
New products have a better chance of succeeding when they fit the business
strategy of the firm or business unit in a manner synergistic with the business unit's
strengths and core competencies. The proposed paths to production for this component
involved two related business units with slightly different charters. We therefore
compared the fit of the component and its production requirements to the goals and
strengths of these two units, to see which path might provide the most synergy in the
future. We started our evaluation by looking at the mission of the firm as a whole, and
then drilled down into the details of the two specific subsidiary units. We then made
qualitative assessments of the strategic fit and ability to leverage core competencies. We
emphasize that in practice, these assessments should be made by the designated
leadership team, against agreed-upon criteria with agreed-upon weights. The assessment
presented here is thus only intended to be illustrative of one possible view and was
primarily designed to spur the management team to increase discussions of strategic fit
and leverage in their own decision-making process.
From the top down, the corporate objective is to be the leading defense and
aerospace systems supplier. In defense, as in many industries, companies have come to
believe that more value can be captured by working "further up the food chain" in
systems integration activity instead of in component and device supply. Consistent with
this view, this firm's objective now emphasizes being known for "mission systems
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integration," a shift from previously being known more as a provider of components and
sub-systems.
Divisions within the corporate structure focus on providing mission systems
integration in specific areas. For example, the parent division in our study is responsible
for providing mission solutions for networked communications, including command and
control and battlespace communications. Other divisions are responsible for space- and
aero-space-based systems, missile systems, and integrated air-, land-, and sea-based
defense systems. Business operating units within each division have further defined
mandates, usually supporting the parent divisions and occasionally crossing several
divisions where broad support is needed.
In our study, the component R&D team (Site A) was aligned with a
communications systems business unit (Site C) whose objective is to provide military
communications solutions at the system level, with core competencies in systems
integration. We saw positives and negatives in this alignment for the component R&D
team. On the positive side, the systems integration development group was able to
leverage the component when preparing bids for next generation communications
systems. A key customer confirmed that the firm does today have "a competitive
advantage by having in-house component development" although he would like to see
multiple component suppliers. There is thus a match in strategic fit on the
communications side, and some leveraging of component competencies. On the other
hand, the component group itself is less able to leverage the core competencies of its
parent business, since component development requires different skill sets and expertise
than systems integration. A component developer must know how to manage and control
fabrication processes, qualify a component for space or airborne operation, and deliver a
completed device to the customer. However, interviews with systems integration
personnel at Site C confirmed that steps in component process control, qualification, and
manufacturing are foreign to them; once a system is specified by the systems integration
group, the design is typically transferred to another location for production, and already-
qualified components are obtained from vendors both internal and external to the firm.
The result of this is that the component group has no local strategic partner within its own
division to guide it in moving from R&D to production and it cannot leverage core
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manufacturing competencies in its own organization. Also, as a component fabrication
group reliant on high tech capital-intensive equipment, it is an anomaly in a systems
integration organization which is not used to its costs7 and cannot easily absorb its skilled
technical workers. Finally, one last drawback is that current programs for the component
extend beyond communications, for example to high energy laser delivery for laser-based
weapons. Weapons applications are not within the mandate of the parent
communications business unit, so these programs are considered "step-out" projects from
the perspective of this unit, even if they are consistent with the mandate of the firm as
whole.
We next checked to see whether a better fit would be obtained with the second
proposed organization at Site B. This second organization is an independent unit with
responsibility to support several major corporate divisions by developing and producing
electro-optic components for communications, missiles, and weapons systems. The unit
has a wide variety of product lines based on several primary technology areas and ships
tens of thousands of space- and military-qualified devices each year to internal and
external customers. Most products are made with high tech capital-intensive equipment
like semiconductor processing machines. As an exception to the general corporate
mission to focus on mission systems integration, Site B has an explicit mandate to
develop component technology. Understanding this mandate, we find a better strategic
fit for the optical component with Site B (component technology) than with Site A
(communications systems). As an active component supplier, Site B has core
competencies in component engineering, manufacturing, and qualification which could
be directly leveraged in maturing the optical component. These abilities should also
make leveraging the component in systems integration bids easier for the firm, since they
could demonstrate production experience to systems customers. With a mandate to
support several divisions, Site B also can readily support non-communications
applications such as high energy laser-based weapons and could potentially facilitate use
of the component by other divisions. Finally, the fact that Site B supports multiple
product lines means that it has less vulnerability to long term drops in demand. In the
7 In addition to capital equipment depreciation, rent on the clean-room space increases the rate structure of
the entire regional systems integration group significantly, according to the regional director.
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event of a drop in demand for one product, highly skilled workers may be transferred to
work on a different product, since multiple products rely on the semiconductor
processing equipment and associated skills.
One specific concern worth addressing was frequently raised whenever the
question of transferring technology from Site A to Site B was discussed: what about
employees, their expertise, and the firm's capacity for future innovation? In an expertise
evaluation, it is clear that the specific knowledge and the specific ability to produce the
component currently reside at Site A. Staff at Site B have comparable training and skill,
though, and can be expected to easily learn the required production techniques, if
processes are mature enough to transfer, or to appropriately re-engineer product design
for robustness and manufacturability where processes are not mature enough to transfer.
In this case, knowledge transfer should strengthen, not weaken, the firm. Again, this
comes down to a question of versatility and breadth of contribution. Cross-trained
employees and teams help firms to cope in downturns because they can be re-assigned to
other product lines. The absence of any other product development work on Site A
equipment and the absence of additional component-level innovations coming out of the
group in the years since the original device invention blocked us from concluding that the
firm would lose substantial device innovation capability if the component work were
ultimately transferred from Site A to Site B. Clearly knowledge transfer would require
cooperation and assistance of staff in Site A.8 Such cooperative knowledge transfer
occurs routinely in firms and between firms in all industries today. The division would,
however, also need to make sure that such a transfer would not jeopardize ongoing
systems-level innovations for uses of the component in subsystems and systems relevant
to the parent communications division at Site C.
5.4 Financial options
A third criterion for a successful new product introduction is financial
attractiveness, including market attractiveness, market need, and positive return versus
risk. Cooper emphasizes that firms should not make NPD decisions on financial
assessments alone, but financial criteria should still be included as part of a complete
8 It was estimated that the assistance of about four key staff members would be needed for about one year
in order to effectively transfer the product. These costs were included in financial analyses.
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assessment. The more robust the financial expectations from a new product even in the
event of adverse circumstances, the more confident a firm may be that it is a good
investment. We thus considered four financial scenarios, under a variety of best- and
worst-case conditions, to see which investments could make the most sense for this firm.
Scenarios evaluated included (I) investment and activity at Site A only, (II) a hybrid of
investment and activity at both Sites A and B (the assumed approach), (III) production
investments at Site B with no additional investments at Site A, and (IV) limited
investment at Site A with potential future investments for production at Site B delayed by
a few years. These scenarios are summarized in Table 5-1. Options I - III assume
immediate investment at the relevant site(s), while Option IV assumes delayed
investment. The outcome of Option I would be both R&D and production capability at
Site A. The outcome of Option II would be enhanced R&D capability at Site A with
production capability at Site B. Option III would result in full production capability at
Site B, but no enhancements to the R&D capability at Site A. Option IV would make no
immediate R&D-level investments and would delay production-level expenditures until a
make/buy decision at a later date, with an option to invest for production capability at
Site B in the event of a decision to make the component internally.
Option Captial investment description Resulting R&D Resulting
Capability Production
Capability
I Immediate investment at Site A Site A (production Site A
only equivalent)
II Immediate investment at both Site A (enhanced) Site B
Sites A and B
III Immediate investment at Site B Site A (limited Site B
only upgrades)
IV Delayed investment at Site B, if Site A (limited Delayed option to
make/buy decision is to make. upgrades) invest at Site B
Table 5-1. Summary of the four financial scenarios modeled.
Scenarios were evaluated on the basis of net present value (NPV) and internal rate
of return (IRR) from cash flow projections over a 10 year period. Key inputs to the
models included required capital expenditures and expected profits from expected future
67
contracts. A financial model including all capital expenditures requested for Option I had
already been developed before the start of the internship. This model had an extremely
complete associated capital equipment list due to the expected obsolescence of older
Site A equipment and the inclusion of equipment for a proposed capacity expansion.
This Option I model was used as the foundation to develop Options II - IV. Capital
equipment lists and processing run sheets were reviewed line-by-line with staff from
Site B to identify specific capital investments which would be needed at Site B. Ongoing
capital expenditures for maintenance of the clean room infrastructure were included
based on the experience of the team at Site B. All capital investments were depreciated
using 150% declining balance converting to straight line depreciation over a 10 year life.
Best- and worst-case scenarios for capital needs were also developed for each option
based on the probability that certain equipment would or would not be required as a result
of ongoing technical work.
Some of the most important numbers in financial analyses are the projected sales
that a firm expects to get. Entrepreneurs notoriously overestimate projected revenues and
revenue growth rates. To mitigate the problem of overestimating returns, this firm uses a
system of "factored" and "unfactored" sales. Usually, unfactored sales represent the total
addressable market, while factored sales represent the fraction of the market contracts
that the firm realistically expects the government to fund and the firm to win. Factored
sales are the appropriate revenues to use in financial calculations, because they take risk
and market share into account. In the case of this particular component, though, a
slightly different definition was being used, perhaps since the total addressable market
was less well known. For this product, factored sales represented the full amount of
known optical system-level contracts within the firm's 5-year plan that the firm expected
to win and to which the business unit had committed in its 5-year plan. Sales in years 6-
10 followed a growth rate projected by a detailed analysis of the market conducted in
2004, with an allowance for some slippage observed in government funding since 2004.
Unfactored sales were then backed out of the given factored sales, using a confidential
internal factor. This approach is not in and of itself worrisome, except that in some cases
the unfactored numbers had been used to justify capital expenditures, as they provided a
more optimistic return on investment. To be consistent with the firm's past analyses
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and to be rigorous in the numbers presented to management, we ran models using both
sets of numbers, but we emphasize here our belief that the factored sales to which the
business unit leadership team had committed are the appropriate numbers to use.
All financial analyses were also done from the rolled up perspective of the firm,
with the perspective of the individual business units included only where appropriate.
This was critical to correctly understand the impact of investment options at Site B. As
noted in section 5.1, it had originally been assumed that Site B would foot the bill for any
capital investments made there to support the component, because it was assumed that
Site B would earn profit from making the device. In fact, however, as a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the firm, at the corporate level Site B was prohibited from taking any profit
from the divisions that it was designed to support. Consistent with standard corporate
financing practices to avoid double marginalization, product sold internal to the firm by
Site B is transferred at marginal cost, i.e., labor plus materials, while product sold
externally is sold at market or government contract pricing. Since Site B would only be
producing devices for internal consumption,9 Site B would only receive funding for
component-specific labor hours. Thus the critical question for Site B became whether
there was sufficient labor volume in future contracts to balance the additional capital
depreciation that it would have to take on. For this, we compared the ratio of annual
labor to annual depreciation against a confidential internal threshold. Since revenues in
the model were at the system level, we also made a very rough estimate of the fraction of
each system-level contract which was expected to go towards component production.
The relative internal rate of return from the four scenarios under study is shown in
Figure 5-1. All options appeared to have high IRR when unfactored (total potential) sales
were used, but only Options III and IV had IRR above the corporate hurdle rate (dashed
line) when factored (expected) sales were taken into account. NPV results were similar.
Note that Option IV also implicitly included a possibility of purchasing components
externally (not shown), rather than investing at Site B, in which case returns on Option
IV would be higher. Options I and II both yielded negative NPV values for factored
sales, indicative of undesirable investments. Option II is clearly the least desirable option
9 No external component sales were assumed, in order to maintain the perceived systems-level advantage of
having an in-house component supplier with a unique capability.
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from a financial standpoint, requiring almost 60% more capital expenditures than Option
III, on the same revenue base. Option I, investing heavily at Site A only, was also not
viable in the factored sales case. All net profits from systems-level contracts were
insufficient to justify the requested immediate component-level capital expenditures at
Site A.
Unflactored
on
Factored
Option
Figure 5-1. Internal rate of return ranges for the four financial options under study, for
both factored (solid) and unfactored (hatched) revenues.
Options III and IV appeared to be the most desirable from a pure NPV and IRR
standpoint, at the corporate level. Since these involve internal transfers, though, site
specific metrics for Site B must be checked. For Option III, we found that the amount of
component fabrication labor predicted in the factored sales cases was insufficient to
justify Site B taking on the associated capital expenditures. This was also true for the
first several years of the unfactored sales analysis. These results implied that unless
there was a corporate level change in the metrics by which Site B was evaluated, it would
not make sense for Site B to invest. Only Option IV appeared viable from both corporate
and individual business unit perspectives. By delaying purchase of capacity expanding
equipment for a few years and investing at Site B where some existing equipment was
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already in place, IRR and NPV were both maximized, and the risk to Site B was
minimized by starting Site B participation at a point when device volumes could justify
capital expenditures. An exemplary metric illustrating the ratio of new labor hours to
new capital depreciation for Site B is schematically shown in Figure 5-2. As volume
increases in later years, labor is sufficient to carry the associated capital depreciation
expenses.
IV, unfactored
4-A
IV, factored
4-Threshold
III, factored
Year
Figure 5-2. Schematic representation of financial metrics for Site B.
5.4.1 Potential additional revenue
The financial options above would all be more desirable if more revenue could be
brought in to offset the capital expenditures. However, only revenues which can directly
be accessed as a result of investments belong in a financial capital justification. A few
other revenue generating ideas were discussed within the firm, including intellectual
property (IP) sales, licensing and/or production of the component for non-defense
purposes, for example as part of a telecommunications switch, and sales to other defense
contractors. We briefly discuss these here, to acknowledge them and also to explain why
those revenues, with the exception of possible external sales for other defense purposes,
do not in fact belong in the financial models above.
The most prominently discussed "opportunity" was to generate several million
dollars in one-time sale or royalty fees by licensing IP for a non-defense application. In
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fact, an outside consulting firm had recently provided a very optimistic assessment of
potential IP-related revenues, and significant short term receipts had been included in
previous financial models. We excluded those revenues from our analysis not only
because of the uncertainty of these receipts, but also because whether or not the firm
receives these revenues is independent of whether the firm spends today on capital
equipment, so they do not belong in the capital justification.' 0
A similar argument holds for revenues which would be generated from non-
defense sales of the component. The idea was proposed, internally and also externally by
a primary customer, that it would be desirable for the firm to produce components for
example for a telecommunications application, in addition to producing them for defense.
This is similar to the "dual-use manufacturing" proposal for civilian and military
operations [12]. There are two problems with this idea. First, non-defense component
applications clearly do not fit within the business strategy of any of this firm's business
units. The firm lacks core competencies in producing for or selling to a non-defense
market and it would be extremely difficult to justify such a step outside of the norm for
this one small component. Second, even in the event that the firm chose to invest for a
non-defense production line, or convinced a non-defense partner to do so, competition in
commercial products, especially telecom devices, is so severe that there is little
probability that military and commercial devices would ever be made on the same line.
Today labor accounts for over 90% of the cost of a single device, which rate is untenable
in the commercial component market. For telecom, the device would require significant
re-engineering to reduce costs and would in all likelihood ultimately be fabricated in
Asia, a location which is out of bounds for defense work. The firm might be able to
benefit from the faster learning curve that the commercial group would see, if a deal were
structured to allow this knowledge capture, but investments would have entirely separate
financial justifications.
The last possible option for additional revenue generation is to sell devices to
other defense contractors to build volume and utilize equipment capacity. A key
JO If the firm wants to find its return on investment going all the way back to the 1980s and 1990s, these
revenues could be included as returns on the intellectual property developed at those times, and would
offset some of the earlier capital expenditures. Just as "sunk costs" are excluded from the financial
analysis for today's investment decisions, though, "sunk revenues" are also excluded.
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customer thought that in an ideal scenario, the firm could still "make the best device" and
integrate it with a slight advantage in-house, but still sell them outside to other defense
contractors. This option has not been discussed significantly in the past, but is worth
evaluation in the future. Here the application (and cost structure) would be consistent
with the firm's strategy and capabilities but the firm would give up some "uniqueness" on
the systems side. The initial goal of using the component to open the door to the business
unit for systems-level communications contracts has largely been fulfilled, though, so this
might be acceptable. The division is now a credible supplier in the systems space and has
additional contracts which use other technology approaches. In the future, when
expenditures under Option IV are to be authorized, the firm may want to evaluate in more
detail the trade-offs between facilitating competitors on the systems side and capturing
value on the component side.
5.5 Product uniqueness and advantage
A final key requirement for new product success is "Having a superior
differentiated product that delivers unique benefits and better value to the customer."
This means both that the product must be superior and differentiated, and that the firm
must be able to uniquely provide it. In this study, we took at face value the commitments
from existing customers and the results of previous market studies as confirmation that
the technology does indeed deliver unique customer benefits. The component technology
enables communications networks with no moving parts and has advantages in terms of
size, weight, and power handling capability over more conventional technology
approaches. As long as the promised technical performance can be delivered, this
advantage will be preserved." For our discussion here, we limit our analysis to whether
or not this firm has a unique superior product, relative to other potential component
providers. To assess the firm's competitive advantage in providing this technology we
considered the firm's IP position, "sole source" contract justifications, and published
reports of comparable devices provided by competitors. Here we found that the firm has
had a competitive advantage in the past, but that the relative advantage has decreased in
recent years, so the firm does need to be more wary of competition.
"Ongoing systems-level trade studies (internal to the firm and out of the scope of this study) will also
serve to validate or challenge this assumption.
73
Intellectual property ownership is often cited to back up a claim that a company
has unique control of a product. For this to be the case, the firm must have a
comprehensive IP position and must be able to defend its ownership. This is difficult to
claim for this product for two reasons. First, it is fundamentally very difficult to defend
IP in the defense world: if a contractor believes that another supplier is infringing a
patent while providing product at the government's request, the wronged contractor can
only sue the government, not the other supplier. Since the government is the firm's
customer, there is a disincentive to sue. IP protection is thus not very strong for defense
components. Second, although the firm does own some of the original patents in this
technology space, its relative portion of the patent portfolio is decreasing and aging. To
qualitatively determine IP strength, we searched the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) database to find IP relevant to the technology, starting first with the firm's own
patents and then conducting backwards and forwards citation searches. This generated
over 600 cross-citations referencing about 450 patents. From these we checked almost
200 specific patents to qualitatively assess relevance. From this search, we found that the
IP space was in fact fairly well populated. The firm holds the largest fraction, about one-
quarter, of the most relevant IP, primarily covering device design and applications. A
key competitor (Competitor A) holds about one-fifth of the relevant IP, with strengths in
particular processing elements such as thin film designs. This leads to the conclusion that
the firm has a strong, but not unique IP position. Its position is also weakening as the
patents from the early 1990s expire.
Without strong IP protection, the firm needs to justify uniqueness based on other
criteria, such as technical superiority. In fact, the team has received at least one contract
based on a "sole source" justification, as the only contractor capable of providing the
technology at the time the contract was awarded. To find out if this advantage still held,
we interviewed a key customer who had been involved in that award. He confirmed that
indeed at the time, the firm did have a unique capability. However, since the contract
award, Competitor A had also demonstrated comparable device performance, and in the
eyes of this customer, Competitor A would now be a credible supplier. A "sole source
award" would possibly not be made in the next contract award phase. Consistent with the
DoD goal to not be dependent on a single supplier, this customer was also very interested
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in developing other firms to produce comparable technology. Although work at
Competitor A was not being actively funded right now, he "would like to send them a
contract." Overall, the customer saw the firm in our study as being in first place in
technology development but identified two credible competitors and a few potential new
entrants.
Finally, we reviewed public information covering the two credible competitors to
develop an understanding of their technical capabilities. Competitor A only entered this
particular optical component space in the late 1990s but has been working on other liquid
crystal based devices for many years. Synergies with these other devices seem to have
made it somewhat easy for them to enter the optical component space. They published
record device performance in 2004. They utilize an extensive collaboration network
including many of the same people collaborating with the R&D group in our study, in
defense, industry, and academia. Competitor A is primarily focused on component
development and supply, not on systems. Published news reports indicate Competitor A
has invested in large new clean-room manufacturing facilities in recent years. Like
Site B of the partner firm, this competitor has a wide product line spanning many
technologies, so they are well positioned to survive fluctuations in market demand. The
optical component would only represent a small fraction of their sales. Competitor A
does not appear to be making a strong push into the optical component space at present,
but they have demonstrated competency that will likely make them a credible supplier
should they choose to enter. The firm has recently been acquired by another firm, so
there is some uncertainty regarding their future.
The second competitor (Competitor B) actively produces components based on
similar technology for both the commercial and the defense market. Competitor B has
been in the industry since the late 1980s, but is still quite small, with fewer than 20
employees. They focus primarily on component design and assembly, outsourcing much
of the capital-equipment-intensive portions of processing to an external foundry. The
firm's products in the OEM commercial market are fairly simple devices. Competitor B
can probably benefit from its manufacturing learning in these simpler products to bring
down its overall manufacturing costs for more complex products. In the defense world,
the firm is a small player, but has received on the order of $10.5M in DoD Small
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Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR)
funding over a 15 year period [27]. Again, they collaborate with many of the same
groups, including commercial and academic liquid crystal suppliers. They should be
considered a credible entrant into component supply if and when this becomes profitable.
Their reliance on an external foundry will likely help them to wait out delays in system
deployments since their lower capital investment structure means they are not overly
reliant on immediate returns. Competitor B holds two relevant recent patents but since
their issue has been content to put work into the public domain.
5.6 "Soft" conclusions
The review above indicates that the market for this particular component will
possibly be somewhat competitive in the future. The firm seems to be the strongest
competitor today, but should keep competition in mind as investment plans are made.
Much of the firm's original "first mover" advantage has been lost in the twenty plus years
since the original invention. The firm itself is actually now facing a capital-based
"barrier to entry" into component production, since it needs to expand or replace aging
equipment.
If the firm chooses to source components internally, our analysis of strategic fit
and core competencies indicates that an ultimate alignment of component production
with Site B would probably put the firm in the strongest competitive position. However,
comprehensive investments should not be made in the near term at any site, unless the
firm is prepared for financial losses. Because of the highly capital intensive nature of the
component fabrication processes, the firm is in a position where automatic profitability
through defense contract margins does not apply. Until volumes are sufficient and
sufficiently certain to justify large capital expenditures, the firm should focus on
optimizing processes in the current facility, to prepare for a technology transfer at a later
date. In the mean time, it was recommended that improvements could also be made in
the organizational structure by designating a clear technical leader responsible for
component technology development. This appointment has since been made and reports
are very positive regarding recent progress that the R&D team has made under this new
leadership.
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The firm should also continue to monitor potential alternative component
suppliers who have shown credible capabilities. These firms could either enter as
suppliers to competitor systems providers in the future, or a partnership could be formed
to source component supply from one of these firms at a later date. A make/buy decision
will need to be made in the future based on a comprehensive trade analysis of the costs
and benefits of an external supply against the costs and benefits of investing in a captive
in-house supply.
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Chapter 6: Case Study: Manufacturing Readiness Assessments
We now turn to the technical evaluation of the component to supplement the
organizational, strategic, financial and competitive analysis. In this part of the case
study, the objective was to build a picture of the manufacturing readiness of the
component. Fabrication of the component could be broken down into eight primary
areas, including thin film deposition processes, photolithography, liquid crystal alignment
layer preparation, fabrication of the liquid crystal itself, assembly, electronic controls,
packaging and test. A detailed investigation of all aspects of fabrication would not have
been feasible within the timeframe allotted to the internship, so we selected a few
exemplary processes to evaluate: the externally supplied liquid crystal, internally
supplied thin films, and various steps in the assembly and final test process. We
assessed capability in these areas using the DoD MRL criteria of Chapter 4, since AFRL
is the primary customer for the device today. As noted above, since no compliance with
MRLs has yet been required by contracts, the intent of the MRA is only to provide the
firm with a benchmark and to identify areas for focus in the future. The firm is not yet
expected to have completed any MRLs.
6.1 TRL baseline
Manufacturing Readiness Levels incorporate Technology Readiness Levels into
their metrics, so we started by trying to find consensus regarding the device TRL
capability. Unfortunately, as noted in Chapter 4, there are no explicit certification
authorities specified by the TRL metric, so we found a wide variety of opinions as to the
maturity of the device. In our first survey, we asked respondents familiar with TRL
metrics to indicate the TRL of the simplest form of the device, a component built on a
glass substrate with a specific liquid crystal. The nineteen responses ranged from TRL 1
to TRL 6, with a mean of 3.4. Many in the organization expressed surprise at the range
of responses, although others did not. One interpretation of the high variability of
opinion is that it is consistent with the uncertainty regarding technical leadership.
Another interpretation is that variability is attributable to a possible lack of training in this
area. Five respondents did indicate they were "not familiar" with TRL metrics and chose
not to respond to the question. Responses to the same question on the second survey,
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after some internal discussions regarding TRL metrics, showed more consensus: 79% of
respondents chose TRL 3 or TRL 4 and the remaining 21% selected TRL 5. Only one
respondent to the second survey indicated insufficient familiarity with TRL metrics.
TRL 3 encompasses "Analytical and experimental critical function and/or
characteristic proof-of-concept" while TRL 4 requires "Component and/or breadboard
validation in laboratory environment." Consensus was ultimately reached in discussions
with the R&D team that the device today is in qualification for TRL 3. These discussions
led to the acknowledgment that precedence relations require that the component cannot
be at a higher TRL than the least mature of its subcomponents. Although past devices
using a commercially available liquid crystal and a different assembly process have met
TRL 4 criteria, a new specialty liquid crystal and a new assembly method are both being
developed on current contracts. The critical function of this new material and new
method was yet to be tested as of the end of the internship, so the maturity of the current
design reverts to below TRL3. Since devices with other materials and assembly
processes have indeed been validated in a laboratory environment, though, as long as the
new processes and materials under development are demonstrated successfully, the
program should move quickly from TRL 3 to TRL 4.
6.2 Externally supplied liquid crystal
The liquid crystal is the most fundamental enabling technology for the optical
component in our study, so it is appropriate to use it as a subject for an MRL assessment.
Further, the liquid crystal material and supply, along with the methods for filling and
sealing the liquid crystal cavity, were identified by survey respondents as the two highest
risk elements in device fabrication. To evaluate the liquid crystal, we applied the MRL
criteria of Chapter 4. Data was gathered from available data logs in the R&D laboratory
and also from discussions with firm and supplier personnel. At present, the liquid crystal
used in the devices is provided through a research subcontract with an academic
researcher at a U. S. university. As the prime contractor on communications systems
contracts using the component, the defense firm will be responsible for ensuring that its
liquid crystal supplier complies with MRL requirements.
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6.2.1 MRL 3: Identification of liquid crystal manufacturing concepts
The primary requirements of MRL 3 are identification of processes and materials.
In our study, we found very limited existing liquid crystal-related documentation aside
from sparse log book records. However, discussions with the university researchers
allowed us to fairly easily construct a first cut at identifying manufacturing concepts for
MRL 3. For example, the high level manufacturing flow for producing a new liquid
crystal consists of (1) designing molecules, (2) synthesizing or purchasing compounds,
(3) synthesizing mixtures, (4) testing formulations, and (5) testing devices. Steps (1), (3),
and (4) are usually carried out at the U. S. university. For step (2), one or more specialty
compounds are typically sourced externally from an Engineering, Chemistry, and Physics
Department at a foreign (usually European) university. Materials and resources needed
include these specialty molecules, approximately $40K of testing equipment, and
preferably a clean room environment for synthesis and mixture formulation. We also
found that the R&D team at Site A has not yet designated a point person in-house who is
responsible for understanding liquid crystal characterization, for tracking liquid crystal
performance, and for tracking incoming quality and consistency. We listed this person as
a required resource to be developed, since we believe this will be necessary to meet the
requirements of MRL 4.
MRL 3 also starts the process of highlighting areas which will require new or
different manufacturing capabilities or resources. Here we stress that all liquid crystal
work today is done in a university research laboratory with no formal manufacturing
capability and where many requirements are not met. For example, the university lab is
not in fact in a clean room. It also has limited testing capability. The current university
measurement capabilities include only a single wavelength laser source and a small
temperature range. The actual component operating temperature is expected to be quite
high, and at least two other different wavelengths will be used in defense applications.
Liquid crystal performance is highly sensitive to both wavelength and temperature and a
single point measurement is insufficient to predict performance. In order to meet MRL 4
requirements for identification of key design requirements and characteristics,
performance at operating wavelength and temperature will be needed, so we highlight the
need for future investments in test and measurement equipment. We also highlight the
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longer term need, which will reappear in MRL 4, for a commercial liquid crystal supply.
The firm has been in discussions with a few specialty chemical companies and believes
that a supplier can be found. The primary challenge will be making the work financially
attractive. The number of devices being made is in fact very small today. This fact,
coupled with the fact that over 500 devices can be filled with only 5 g of liquid crystal,
means that manufacturing the material will probably be unattractive to large liquid crystal
suppliers such as Merck or Sigma Aldrich and that a "boutique" supplier will be
necessary.
Overall, we do not expect significant hurdles to the firm in meeting MRL 3
metrics, provided that TRL 3 is met with the newly designed materials. Compliance with
MRL 3 will likely require more detailed documentation than what we have summarized
above, but this documentation should be straightforward for the firm to produce or to
request from the university research team as today's liquid crystal supplier.
6.2.2 MRL 4: Identification of the key liquid crystal manufacturing processes
MRL 4 presents more challenges to the liquid crystal than MRL 3. MRL 4
focuses on identification of manufacturing processes: flows, materials, and risks. It also
requires identification of key design characteristics as a precursor to demonstrating
performance against those requirements at MRL 5. For the liquid crystal, this will mean
identification of technical parameters such as optical birefringence and figure of merit
(FoM) requirements, operating temperature requirements, speed requirements, and
reliability needs (hermeticity, radiation, etc.). Building a database to monitor
performance and correlating device performance to key design characteristics (to validate
these requirements) will be necessary. In addition, more specific criteria will likely need
to be provided to the university research team. Today, the university team has only been
given the objective of developing a liquid crystal with the fastest possible response.
Additional requirements for performance against critical environmental criteria
(temperature, radiation) also need to be included in design requirements.
MRL 4 incorporates TRL 4 as a base requirement: "basic technological elements
must be integrated to establish that the 'pieces' will work together to achieve concept-
enabling levels of performance for a component and/or breadboard." In addition to this,
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MRL 4 also requires identification of interactions between processes. At present, a
chemical interaction between the tolane-based liquid crystal and something in the device
assembly process has been observed and has been under investigation for a few years.
The interaction causes undesirable degradation of the liquid crystal, i.e., the pieces do not
yet work together. To reach TRL 4 and MRL 4, this degradation will need to be
eliminated, and the solution will need to be documented for future program stages.
Similarly, the liquid crystal today is known to interact with ultra-violet (UV) light. Some
processing steps have been modified to eliminate UV exposure of the liquid crystal.
MRL 4 will require documentation of UV exposure risks so that future process
modifications do not reintroduce the problem. Note that achieving MRL 4 is not blocked
by these documentation notes, but awareness is raised regarding potential future risks.
MRL 4 also starts to build information for sourcing. Evaluation of the industrial
base will likely indicate that development of a non-university source will be required.
Similarly, when MRL 4 starts the process of identifying sole source, single source, and
foreign source vendors, foreign source concerns may be raised over the foreign supply of
key liquid crystal molecules. Foreign sourcing is in fact expected to be one of the
primary concerns for government adoption of the technology, independent of which
defense contractor provides it. The university research team is also the primary liquid
crystal source for competitors, and according to the U. S. university team, the European
university is the primary supplier of high tech specialty molecules to most liquid crystal
suppliers, including commercial firms such as Merck and Sigma Aldrich. It is thus
expected that most paths today will lead back to a single foreign source for key liquid
crystal elements. This state will need to be approved by the defense customer throughout
the manufacturing progression. Alternatively, the defense customer may choose to
support development of U.S.-based expertise equivalent to that at the foreign universities.
For the time being, the firm in our study should be able to meet MRL 4 requirements,
since these do not yet require mitigation of sole/foreign sourcing, and the customer today
is aware of off-shore sourcing for liquid crystal materials. Still, reaching future levels
may be challenging, depending on the customer's wishes.
Finally, MRL 4 starts requirements for planning and for funding commitments.
This includes both manufacturability of the component (here the liquid crystal) and of the
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system (here the optical device). Cost drivers must be assessed and a plan for maturation
from MRL 4 to MRL 6 is required. Funding sufficient to reach MRL 5 must be
available. A detailed assessment of the liquid crystal against MRL 4 metrics was
provided to the firm. Many steps in MRL 4 are not yet started, as would be expected for
an early stage technology development effort. Meeting these requirements will require
contributions from both the firm and from today's university source. As the prime
contractor, the firm will be responsible for ensuring that the university (or any other
liquid crystal supplier) meets the documentation requirements where appropriate.
6.2.3 MRL 5: Liquid crystal manufacturing process development
MRL 5 focuses on manufacturing process development. This includes
establishing process capability and control, value stream mapping, and make/buy
tradeoffs. A viable business plan is required, along with cost and schedule projections.
For the liquid crystal, this will mean identification of a viable supplier. At MRL 5, this
includes beginning planning to minimize sole/single/foreign sources. MRL 5 also
requires planning for maturation to MRL 7, and available finding to reach MRL 6.
On the technical performance side, MRL 5 also requires TRL 5: "Component
and/or Breadboard validation in relevant environment." The optical component will be
subject to harsh operating and non-operating conditions. Ambient operating temperature
ranges vary with application, but a rough study of several applications indicates that
operation from about 15 'C to 65 'C and storage from about -30 *C to + 70*C will be
required. Liquid crystals are characterized by phase transition temperatures at which they
transition from crystalline form to smectic phase, smectic to nematic phase, and nematic
to isotropic phase (clearing temperature). The optical device operates in the nematic
phase and heaters are included to control operating temperature. However, devices stored
at -30*C will clearly go into the crystalline state, passing through the smectic state.
Today, when crystallization occurs, devices are heated to above the clearing temperature
in order to realign liquid crystal molecules with the inner cell surface alignment layer. It
is an open question whether including a high temperature cycle at startup is a viable long-
term option from the customer standpoint, and what repeated high temperature cycles
will do to device reliability. Liquid crystal research goals today do include development
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of isomers that do not have a smectic phase, and that form a true eutectic mixture. Such
future liquid crystals could eliminate some of the issues above, but these liquid crystals
will need to be built into devices and validated on their own. To avoid limiting (by
maturity precedence requirements) the maturity of the component to the maturity of these
yet-to-be developed isomers, customers assume that success will be possible with liquid
crystals available today.
Work towards MRL 5 has not been started today at the liquid crystal level.
Achieving MRL 5 will require a significant increase in rigor, including data collection
and analysis, establishing a requirements flow-down from the optical device, and
modeling of interactions with component tolerances. It will also require significantly
more detail in business planning, both for a non-university source for the liquid crystal,
and for reducing dependence on the foreign source.
6.2.4 Liquid crystal summary
The liquid crystal is clearly a high risk element in the component, considering
technical and manufacturing concerns. Maturity today is limited by the introduction of a
new mixture, which keeps maturity below TRL 3 and MRL 3 until proof-of-concept is
demonstrated. On the technical side, the chemical interaction issue must be solved in
order for the device to meet TRL 4 (and MRL 4) requirements. More detailed technical
requirements must also be flowed down to the supplier to make sure that the liquid
crystal will meet all requirements. Adding more detailed specifications and verifying
performance against these criteria represents a shift in mindset for the R&D team, which
has focused more in the past on achieving "hero" performance along a single dimension.
On the manufacturing side, sourcing is the most serious issue, since the current source is
not commercial and relies on foreign-sourced components. Meeting MRL 5 criteria is
likely to be challenging.
6.3 Internal wafer processing
Manufacturing readiness of internal wafer processes was assessed to understand
the maturity of processing steps controlled by the R&D team and to identify areas which
would need to be improved to mature the device towards MRL 6 within the next few
years. Wafer processing includes several thin film deposition processes. Anti-reflective
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(AR) coatings, transparent electrodes, and isolating dielectric layers are all deposited on
optically transparent wafers as part of the fabrication process. Below we present a
general overview of the wafer processing maturity according to MRL 3, MRL 4 and
MRL 5 metrics. Select results from specific processes are also presented to illustrate
control charting and yield prediction techniques which will be useful for assessing yields
at MRL 4, and meeting process capability and control requirements at MRL 5 and
MRL 6.
6.3.1 MRL 3: Identification of wafer processing manufacturing concepts
MRL 3 requires technical performance at or above TRL3 supplemented by
identification of manufacturing flows, materials, and resource requirements. In thin film
processing, most criteria for MRL 3 are met today, with one reservation regarding TRL 3.
Starting with the TRL assessment, whether thin film processing meets TRL 3
hinges on a question of whether the final target performance must be demonstrated at
TRL 3 or if performance close to target is sufficient. Most early stage R&D contracts
require experimental critical function and characteristic proof of concept only on a "best-
effort" basis. The team has delivered devices which meet most optical performance
criteria, so TRL 3 has in general been believed to have been met. Our process control
analysis indicated one parameter of concern, though, which will be discussed in section
6.4. Once analytical modeling is done to demonstrate a thin film design which meets this
parameter requirement, TRL 3 should be considered complete.
On the manufacturing side, the team already has in place many of the
requirements called out by MRL 3. Manufacturing flows are detailed in process
documentation "run sheets" for all device builds. Material requirements and resources
are also called out in these run sheets, which specify the particular equipment used for
each step and the source materials for each thin film layer. Material requirements are all
standard semiconductor processing materials such as silicon dioxide, aluminum oxide,
and other thin film oxide materials. Base materials are usually glass substrates with tight
specifications for surface flatness and optical transparency. Regarding new or different
resources, the team has already identified through the capital equipment list reviewed
above the new or additional manufacturing resources which will be required.
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The primary issue which we identified in the manufacturing-specific criteria was
the frequency with which documenting run sheets were updated. Some process changes
were not recorded in updated run sheets resulting in discrepancies between reported and
actual target levels (to be discussed further in section 6.3.4). To fully meet the intent of
MRL 3, we recommend reconciling process documentation with actual device targets.
6.3.2 MRL 4: Identification of key thin film manufacturing processes
MRL 4 presents more challenges in thin film processing than MRL 3. MRL 4
focuses on identification of manufacturing processes: flows, integration, resources, key
design requirements and characteristics, and initial roadmapping to MRL 6. Yield
assessments are also completed on similar processes. Here the primary challenges are
expected to be in understanding the manufacturing capability requirements, critical
processing requirements, and key design characteristics. This challenge comes primarily
from the R&D nature of the work done to date, not from an intrinsic design limitation,
though, so this is an addressable problem. Overall, many of the steps towards MRL 4
have not yet been started.
The primary limitation found in our MRL 4 assessment was an overall shortage of
comprehensive data analysis. As noted above, most early programs had focused on
demonstrating "best effort" performance, typically on a small number of devices. In
general, no device-to-device performance analysis was carried out, nor was device
performance correlated back to processing parameters. Likewise, no uniformity studies
had been done within at least the past five years. Yields were not determined using
performance criteria, but instead only on whether a device made it through the assembly
process. Consistent with these trends, no database existed with current or past processing
data. Most processing records were only kept manually on the run sheets.
The manufacturing flow concept requirements of MRL 4 include a requirement to
assess yields and identify manufacturing capability needs, critical processes, and
interactions between processes. For thin films, this means identifying requirements for
optical transmission, thickness targets, sheet resistance, etc., with regards to uniformity
across the area of a wafer, wafer-to-wafer uniformity within a run, and run-to-run
uniformity. Requirements should include definitions of acceptable ranges as well as
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target values. Processes such as annealing and subsequent deposition steps are also
known to change the performance of previously deposited films, so the interactions
between these processes must be documented and in-process shifts tracked through the
run sheets. Further, the net effects of all thin film deposition layers needs to be
considered together, for example by budgeting for optical losses between the AR coating
layer and the transparent electrodes. Building a database and correlating device
performance to processing characteristics will clearly be necessary.
Finally, MRL 4 also starts requirements for planning and for funding
commitments. Cost drivers must be assessed and a plan for maturation from MRL 4 to
MRL 6 is required, including funding sufficient to reach MRL 5. Again, data will be
critical, since cost-drivers imply an understanding of yield issues.
6.3.3 MRL 5: Thin film deposition manufacturing process development
MRL 5 focuses on manufacturing process development. This includes
establishing process capability and control, value stream mapping, and initiating
make/buy tradeoffs. A viable business plan is required, along with cost and schedule
projections. Considering the financial analysis from section 5.4, MRL 5 will be the
appropriate point for the firm to decide whether to invest in production capability at
Site B, or if devices should instead be sourced externally. On the technical side, MRL 5
will require an understanding of uniformity across wafers and devices, and impacts on
device yield, whether these are used as steps towards manufacturing within the firm, or as
steps towards qualifying an external provider. Yield/rate improvement studies are
initiated. MRL 5 also requires planning for maturation to MRL 7, and available funding
to reach MRL 6.
Thin film work towards MRL 5 has for the most part not been started today.
Achieving MRL 5 will require a significant increase in rigor, including data collection
and analysis, establishing a requirements flow-down from the component, and modeling
of interactions with component tolerances. It will require routine process monitoring,
such as in-process control charting. MRL 5 will also require that all specifications and
control limits be established.
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6.3.4 Wafer process control analysis
The manufacturing readiness assessment of wafer processing showed that a
shortage of data collection and analysis will probably become an issue at MRL 4 and
MRL 5. Specifically, the MRL analysis highlights the questions that the DoD and AFRL
wanted to promote, such as "can more than one device be made reproducibly?" Trying to
answer this question, and attempting to set the stage for the team in future device builds,
we analyzed existing data from previous builds to see what level of understanding we
could gain. One frequently heard refrain was "we do not do batch data analysis because
the volumes that we produce are too small for process control analysis to be useful."
Thus, we also sought to see if indeed data volumes were too small, or if useful
information could be obtained. In fact, our analysis did allow us to identify processes
which are likely to be critical for MRL 4 or MRL 5. It also highlighted ways in which
more controlled design-of-experiment (DOE) approaches may be taken in the future in
order to increase the value of the data that is available through low volume builds.
Finally, full analysis of the data indicated potential areas in which time (and cost) may be
saved by identifying non-conforming material at early processing stages. These savings
will be critical as volumes increase in the near future.
6.3.4.1 Test population and method
To provide a meaningful framework for future process control monitoring, we
needed to develop a model with a population of comparable devices. Specifically, we
needed to make sure we did not include devices for which the R&D team had
intentionally varied processing parameters. With the help of the R&D team, we
identified a set of devices for evaluation which had been built during a six month period
to nominally identical design specifications, as part of a final build for a previous
program. Specific thin films were then selected for analysis based on the R&D team's
expectations of processes that should be in control. A detailed report including the full
analysis of all films was provided to the firm. Here, we show only sample results
including behavior of an in-control film (Film A) and an out-of-control film (Film B), for
illustration purposes. We used the Film B data to look for trends across a wafer, and
show how a trend analysis might be used to remove at least one out-of-control wafer. We
also identify correlations between measurements of Film B early in the fabrication
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process and performance at the end of processing, and show how this could be used to
yield wafers early in the process before additional fabrication expenses are incurred. As
with other data, potentially proprietary numerical values have been omitted.
The test population consisted of 14 discrete substrate wafers and 12 unique
superstrate runs used to assemble 23 devices of three different sizes and two different
types. Up to five discrete thin films are deposited on each substrate or superstrate in a
series of coating runs. In general for this device population, most series were unique to
one or two wafers. For example, two wafers might be processed together for Film A,
Film B, Film C, and Film D, and then another two wafers would be processed together
for Film A', Film B', Film C', and then might be split into two batches for Film D' and
Film D", where 'denotes a different deposition run. The 14 substrate wafers were
processed in 7 unique series. Each superstrate was processed in a single unique series.
These unique series unfortunately prevent meaningful analysis of the full film stackup,
but controlled builds using a DOE process were identified as a potential next step for
future builds. We limit our analysis below to only single films with equivalent
processing targets.
For each selected process or parameter, we set up sample control chart analyses to
identify natural control limits and to compare these limits to nominal specifications. Two
commercially available software packages were used for data analysis: SPC Excel 2 and
JMP.' 3
6.3.4.2 Film A results
We first illustrate behavior of an in-control process using data from one type of
deposition run (Film A). Figure 6-1 shows the individual (a) and associated 2-point
moving range (b) control charts generated by measurement of Film A as deposited.
Individual measurements are shown as points. Natural control limits, shown as heavy
dashed lines, are computed based on the mean (heavy solid line) and the sum of the
moving range data. The 95% confidence interval for the mean is also shown (thin dotted
lines).
12 SPC Excel is a Microsoft Excel add-in with SPC (Statistical Process Control) capabilities.
http://www.sigmazone.com/spcxl.htm
13 http://www.jmp.com/
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Figure 6-1. Film A control charts including (a) an individuals control chart, and (b) a 2-
point moving range chart.
The data indicate that the process for Film A is under control, within the natural
control limits shown, and the 95% confidence limit for the mean contained the target
value, which is good, although this interval is wide due to the small number of data
points. Processing documents did not contain upper and lower specification limits for
Film A, so we could not evaluate whether the process was also within specifications, but
this can in the future be done in a straightforward manner by the development team.
The primary unknowns for this process are now the within-wafer uniformity and
within-run uniformity, since we only have one measurement per run, taken on a witness
coupon placed in the chamber with the wafers. Historically, non-uniformity is reported
to be less than a percent. In the future, this non-uniformity should be confirmed. This
value, together with the few percent variation observed run-to-run in Figure 6-1, could be
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used to construct the boundaries of the process capability required for MRL 5
compliance. These serve as a start towards baselining process capability and control for
Film A at MRL 6.
6.3.4.3 Film B results
Other films were not in as good control as Film A. Figure 6-2 shows the
individual (a) and 2-point moving range (b) control charts generated by measurement of a
witness coupon from Film B deposition. Again individual measurements are shown as
points, and natural control limits are included as heavy dashed lines. Two data points
show up as "out-of-control," above the upper control limit. These points indicate that this
process should probably be monitored more closely to determine what may be triggering
these events.
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Figure 6-2. Individuals (a) and 2-point moving range (b) control charts for Film B.
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Two other concerns were raised from the analysis of Film B. First, the natural
control limits computed, even with the two outlying data points removed, were more than
a factor of two wider than the nominal specification limits listed on the wafer processing
run sheets. Second, although the run sheets contained specification limits, these limits
were not used to yield wafers during fabrication. Only about 60% of the data in Figure
6-2 met specifications and yet all wafers were processed and used to build devices.
Together, these observations lead to the conclusion that the existing documentation does
not accurately reflect design requirements or processing rules today. If, on the one hand,
specification limits are incorrectly too narrow, they should be widened to avoid
unnecessary scrap in the manufacturing process and unnecessarily tight equipment
requirements. If, on the other hand, specification limits are actually correct, and final
device performance will be impacted, then the process needs to be improved.
Reconciliation between documentation and actual practice should be done to truly
comply with MRL 3 requirements.
6.3.4.4 Within-wafer uniformity and within-run uniformity
Thus far we have only looked at single point measurements on witness coupons
included in the deposition chamber. We now examine process control data measured at
several different points on a wafer, to understand issues associated with within-wafer
uniformity. We will also briefly investigate within-run uniformity here. For this
purpose, we used another set of measurements of a parameter determined by Film B, but
measured at the end of the process (EOP).
Characterization of within-wafer uniformity requires measurements at multiple
locations on the wafer. Wafers for our device are circular. Nominally square optical
apertures are distributed across a wafer, in a configuration determined by the size of the
aperture and the available size of the wafer. Test structures are included in the
photolithography mask pattern at specific locations across the wafer so that a "map" of
the film uniformity can be constructed. For process monitoring, it is in general desirable
to map as much of the wafer surface as possible, by placing test structures at
representative locations across the wafer, both close to the center and close to the outer
edges. The number of data points along a particular axis determines what order of fit
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may be applied to the data. For example, to get a measure of curvature in film thickness,
measurements would typically be taken at center, and at least two other points ± r along
the x- and y- axes, where r is a radial distance from the center (x, y) = (0, 0). For our
optical devices, test points were unfortunately less than ideal, but some measure of across
wafer uniformity can still be obtained. Three different photolithography mask sets were
used for the three different aperture sizes. Of these, two masks had four test structures at
coordinates approximately equivalent to {(x, y)} = {( xo,yo), (xi, yo), (xi, yj), (xo, yi)}
where xo and yo were approximately in the center, and x, and yi were towards the
periphery. These locations probe less than half the wafer since they are only effectively
in a single quadrant. The third mask, however, had five test structures at coordinates
approximately equivalent to {(x, y)} = {(xo,yo), (xi, yi), (-x2 , yI), (-x2 , -y2), (xI, -y2)},
where x0 and yo were as before, and xi, x2, yi, and y2 were about 1/3 to 1/2 the distance
from center to edge. Together, this ensemble of measurements allows us to look at some
film variability across a wafer. The third mask also allows us to estimate some measure
of curvature across the wafer, even though test structures were not balanced evenly from
the center and a single axis cannot be drawn through any three points. Overall, the
mappings were unfortunately insufficient to allow 1:1 assignment of specific values to
specific devices within a wafer. Designing future masks with more comprehensive test
locations was suggested as a future improvement.
An X-bar chart of the EOP measurements across each wafer is shown in Figure
6-3. In this plot, each wafer is represented by a point showing the mean value of the four
or five measurements. The box plots around each point show the maximum, minimum,
75th percentile, 25th percentile, and median for each wafer. Every pair of points with the
same symbol represents a pair of wafers processed in the same deposition run. The solid
lines represent the computed upper control limit (UCL), mean, and lower control limit
(LCL) computed from the data.
94
00
UCL
Mean
LCL
Deposition Run &Wafer
Figure 6-3. X-bar chart of Film B, EOP across several wafers.
The data in Figure 6-3 prompt several observations. First, we see that the overall
process was not in control during the entire build, consistent with the results already
reported for Film B. Second, the first four pairs of wafers still appear to perform very
similarly within each pair. Although the data indicate that the process is not in control
and varies significantly from run-to-run, the mean values for the paired wafers in groups
1 (square dots), 3 (x's), and 4 (squares) are fairly close to each other. This might indicate
that the process had been running in control at an earlier date, but that there was slippage
at an early point in this build. The mean values for nine of the wafers fall outside of what
should be the control limits. Third, wafer-to-wafer variation within a run appears to
increase during the build. Finally, for this parameter, actual performance again did not
agree with nominal specification limits in the documentation. Overall, this data indicates
that in-process control charting and monitoring should probably be implemented on
future builds, so that appropriate changes can be made when process control degrades.
The high level of variability within each wafer leads to the question of whether
there are observable trends in film characteristics across a wafer or within the testing
chamber. To explore this, we examined the four wafers for which five data points were
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available. These were the first and last pairs of data from Figure 6-3. We estimated the
x- and y-coordinates of the test points from wafer maps in the documentation and plotted
the measurement results as a function of these coordinates. We then checked for
quadratic trends in the data, since wafer rotation during deposition will often produce
radially varying film thickness. These results are shown in Figure 6-4. The first two
wafers (A and B) do show some quadratic behavior. R2 values for the 2nd order fits (solid
curves) are 0.87 in x and 0.96 in y for Wafer A (dots), and 0.66 and 0.69 for Wafer B
(+'s), indicating that about 90% of the variation in Wafer A and slightly less than 70% of
the variation in Wafer B might be explained by radial variation. Within the second pair
of wafers (dashed curves), we find similar quadratic behavior in Wafer C (x's), although
with less convincing fitting parameters (R2 was only 0.30 in x, but 0.55 in y). More
importantly, though, we see very anomalous behavior in Wafer D (squares). Behavior for
Wafer D diverges significantly from the previous trends and the total variation across the
wafer is much greater. This is important not so much to determine the form of the actual
variation for Wafer D,14 but to point out that in a manufacturing setting Wafer D would
probably be eliminated from the processing group based on this anomalous behavior.
-......... x X 0
(a) Film B, EOP by x-coordinate (b) Film B, EOP by y-coordinate
Figure 6-4. Film B, Msmt #2 results as a function of test coordinates x (a) and y (b).
14 The quadratic fit in pure x-y coordinates for Wafer D is admittedly not particularly appropriate but is
retained in the figure for illustration. In fact, the measurement values increase monotonically along a
nominal southwest/northeast axis from (-x 2, -y2) through (xo,yo) to (xi, ye), but rise and fall along a
nominal northwest/southeast axis from (-x 2, Yi) through (xo,yo) to (xi, -y2). Since no three measurement
locations lie on a straight line, though, we did not do an axis transformation to make the fit to the
nominally rotated axes.
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Finally, the ensemble of the Film B results from the witness coupon
measurements (Figure 6-2) and from the actual wafer data at end-of-process (Figure 6-3
and Figure 6-4) indicate the witness coupon measurements are not particularly reliable
when there is significant variability within a deposition run, between wafers or across a
wafer, because the coupon only samples one location in the chamber. If we do want to
scrap wafers during a manufacturing process in order to avoid processing non-
conforming material, a wafer-specific measurement is likely to be most appropriate.
6.3.4.5 Correlations through the process
In order to reduce costs and avoid unnecessary effort, it is preferable to remove
non-conforming material from the processing queue as soon as it can be identified. In
our analysis above, we identified non-conforming material at the end of processing. We
demonstrate here how this material could in fact be identified at an earlier point in
fabrication.
Measurements equivalent to the EOP data of Figure 6-3 and Figure 6-4 are in fact
taken at four separate times during processing, once after the initial patterning at the
beginning of process (BOP), and then after each additional thin film is deposited. We
compared the data from each set of measurements to the data and found that the data at
EOP can be well predicted from the data at the previous steps, allowing for process
induced shifts. As an example, Figure 6-5 shows the correlation between BOP and EOP
measurements for wafers of Type I (in (a)), to which four additional thin films are added,
and for wafers of Type II (in (b)), to which two additional thin films are added. In both
cases the EOP data can be predicted well by a simple linear fit (solid line). The slope of
the line for the Type I devices is steeper, indicating a larger relative in-process shift, due
to the additional thin film applied to the Type I devices. Both fits are quite good and the
95% individual confidence curves (short dashed lines) contain all but one or two extreme
values. The R2 value for the Type I fit is 0.94, and the R2 value for the Type II fit is 0.68.
The slightly lower R2 value for the Type II fit probably comes from the presence of two
groups of wafers with slightly different patterns, grouped together here to ensure a large
sample size.
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Figure 6-5. Correlation between beginning of process and end of process measurements
for Film B, for (a) Type I wafers and (b) Type II wafers.
These data show that the thin film performance at the end of the process can in-
fact be predicted from the first set of measurements taken after the wafer is patterned.
This means that out-of-specification wafers could in the future be pulled from processing
almost immediately, without the expense of applying the three remaining thin films.
One final piece of information is required before wafers could be yielded at the
initial patterning step. We need to know the correct specification limits for the step at
which wafers are down selected. The horizontal dashed lines in Figure 6-5 show the
specification limits for Film B as documented in the process run sheets. However, as
mentioned above, these specification limits are entered with the same values for the as-
deposited witness coupon, the as-patterned film (BOP), the two intermediate test steps,
and the EOP film. They are also entered with the same value for Type I devices as for
Type II devices. For these specification limits to be useful, they need to take into account
the shifts induced at each step and the differences in device type. Designed experiments
need to be performed to validate the correct specification limits by correlating final
device performance with in-process performance. Hopefully these experiments will also
be able to demonstrate that a wider specification range will be acceptable. As shown in
Figure 6-5, yields to the current narrow specification limit will be extremely low.
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6.3.5 Thin film process summary
The manufacturing readiness analysis and in-process data analysis of
representative thin film deposition processes show that while some steps towards
manufacturing readiness have been taken, many more remain to be done. On the positive
side, existing process documentation will help the team to meet the documentation
portion of the MRL requirements, in particular for MRL 3. On the negative side, a lack
of a database infrastructure and missing batch data analysis was identified as a possible
hindrance to reaching MRL 4 and beyond. A retrospective analysis of previous data
showed that processes were not as well controlled as had initially been believed, and that
many specification limits in the documentation needed to be updated and/or corrected.
However, this analysis also showed that statistically significant data can be obtained from
even small processing runs. As a consequence, the R&D team at Site A has since
implemented real-time on-site control charting and is developing a database for
monitoring process parameters. Processing documentation is also being updated. Initial
reports indicate very positive results from these efforts. As more devices are built on
current and future contracts, the team will have the opportunity to implement meaningful
pro-active SPC controls to improve processes and yields on the way to MRL 5 and
MRL 6. This type of effort should improve performance and reduce costs, making the
component more competitive overall.
6.4 Assembly and final test
To supplement the liquid crystal and thin film analyses, we also completed one
more review in the area of assembly and final test. Many of our findings were similar to
those from the first two studies, so rather than present a detailed analysis of compliance
with MRL criteria, we summarize key learnings here.
First, the assembly process today is highly manual and non-standard. In some
cases it requires artisan-like skills known today by only one employee. In other cases,
qualitative assessments determine when a process is "complete." A comparison of
processes used in the firm with the industrial base also shows many steps for which the
processing technique used by the firm is different from the industry standard process.
Proprietary techniques may be warranted in cases where they provide superior technical
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performance at an acceptable cost, but the cost-benefit analysis needs to be completed.
The customer expects the firm to use as many industry-standard techniques as possible, to
benefit from existing knowledge, so proprietary or unique techniques will undergo
special scrutiny. Overall, from a manufacturing standpoint, although the assembly flow
can be identified today, the actual device design will need to be significantly re-
engineered in order to produce a robust and manufacturable device. In our first survey,
respondents thought on average that the device would need from 45% to 70% redesign or
reengineering in order to meet manufacturability requirements. In the second survey,
69% of respondents also thought the current plan to meet these redesign needs was
insufficient, and only 21% thought the plan was sufficient. The team may be able to
meet MRL 3 by documenting the need for this redesign, but an actual redesign should be
started before MRL 4.
Second, on the assembly side, we found some existing documentation, but we
also found a need for updates and reconciliation of nominal requirements with actual
process capability, as in the case of thin films. For example, Figure 6-6 shows process
control data for an assembly related parameter (X). The process is in control, but the
nominal specification limits fall inside the control limits. A capable process, e.g., one
with Cpk > 2, has specification limits that are much wider than the control limits. In this
case, as in the thin film data analysis, it turns out that the nominal specification limits are
merely quoted, but are not acted upon. In other words, devices outside of specification
are routinely processed. For these devices, the team also reports no apparent adverse
performance from devices outside of the nominal specifications. For parameter X, the
appropriate action is probably to confirm that wider specification limits would be
acceptable, and to update documentation accordingly. If wider limits are not acceptable,
process improvements will be needed. In this case, the team should probably look more
closely at process settings for the first several devices, which seem to follow a tighter
distribution (with smaller moving range values, open diamonds) than the later devices.
The process may indeed have been under better control at an earlier date.
100
2 -
N~.
Device #
(b) Indvidguange control chart
0)8
imand noQminal sL eiiaioiis
be exracte manully fom(t individuals. contrls chatrbefndg
0)0
'5; 4 -
0
1! -2
Device #
(b) Moving range control chart
Figure 6-6. Sample assembly-related process control data, including natural control
limits and nominal specification limits.
In the final test area, we also found trends similar to those identified for the liquid
crystal and the thin films. Again, a comprehensive database was lacking, even where test
systems had been fully automated. Individual test results were stored in individual
electronic formats (some numeric, some images), but device-by-device test results had to
be extracted manually from the individual files. We also had trouble finding
documentation on particular tests, especially where fitting routines had been modified
multiple times over the years. Databases and documentation will both need to be
improved, or called out as required new capabilities, to meet MRL requirements.
Developmrent of an appropriate database will be critical for the studies needed to establish
appropriate parameter control limits for fabrication processes.
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Finally, we used the available final test data as a last check on both liquid crystal
and thin film processes. We did not previously have sufficient multiple measurements of
a single liquid crystal to estimate liquid crystal uniformity, for example for birefringence.
Using final test data, we identified a surrogate parameter (Y) which provides an
alternative way to characterize the liquid crystal uniformity, by looking at device-to-
device consistency. A control chart for parameter Y is shown in Figure 6-7. The
parameter is well controlled and the mean is quite predictable. Variation from lower to
upper control limits is on the order of a few percent. Since this parameter depends on the
liquid crystal and on specific assembly steps, variability comes from both sources. This
gives us confidence that the liquid crystal uniformity is at least better than a few percent.
This estimate could be further refined by additional physical measurements of devices
during assembly, to get an independent estimate of the assembly-related variability. This
data can also be used to benchmark uniformity of future liquid crystals. If the assembly
process does not change, but a new liquid crystal is introduced, changes in parameter Y
can be attributed to variations in the new liquid crystal.
upper mean, 95%CI
lower mean, 95%CI
Device #
Figure 6-7. Final test results for a surrogate liquid crystal monitoring parameter, Y.
For thin film processing, we also did not have an in-process method to monitor
the performance of the final stack of thin films. Final test data allows us to check
whether the ensemble of thin film processing steps produces devices with acceptable
performance. Figure 6-8 illustrates device capability against one parameter (Z) which is
driven by the performance of the ensemble of films together. All but one data point falls
between the control limits. The process thus appears controllable, and control limits may
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even be able to be tightened if the trend in tighter performance of the later devices (open
diamonds). This looks positive, but Figure 6-8 also highlights a major risk. Although
parameter Z may be controllable, it is not centered on the actual performance target,
shown by the dash-dotted line. This is in fact a performance threshold which no device
has yet reached. This is what prompts the concern above regarding TRL compliance for
the device and ultimately for the system. As noted before, all previous builds, this one
included, are contracted on a best-effort basis. Thus the performance in Figure 6-8 is
contractually acceptable for these earlier contracts, and may in fact represent state-of-the
art achievement. It is, however, non-conforming with future deployed system needs.
Target- -
.: Theoretical mean
A.
E
a
Device #
(a) Individuals control chart for parameter Z. The target is shown as a dash-dotted line.
N
Device #
(b) 2-point moving range control chart for parameter Z.
Figure 6-8. Thin film-driven final test performance.
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The primary concern is that the systems being designed today to use the
component assume that the target specification will be achieved, but there is not a clear
path towards meeting this goal. The expected performance (theoretical mean, dotted line)
of the design today falls below the target. Several devices are close to the theoretical
value, but the design itself must be changed in order to reach the target. Analysis of
parameter Z on a previous set of devices from a few years earlier shows equivalent
performance (the two populations are statistically similar). There have not yet been
sufficient design changes from one build to another.
6.5 Manufacturing readiness assessment summary
The review of component manufacturing readiness against MRL metrics to a
large extent reinforces the strength of the reasoning that is prompting MRL
implementation. Unless manufacturing-specific requirements are made clear early in the
product design process, there is a high risk that manufacturing concerns will be left
outside the process. This is not because of an intent to ignore them. Instead, it is an
outgrowth of the R&D search for a "hero" technical result and a focus on finding the
single device which can demonstrate superior performance. We see this in the liquid
crystal sourcing, in which the best research is at the university level and the best
molecular synthesis is available in Europe, so this supply route is used. We see this in
the thin film processing arena, in which batch-to-batch data is not gathered or analyzed
and process documentation does not match actual processing, frequently because it is
time consuming or cumbersome to perform these task for small volume runs. And we see
this in assembly and final test where again it is more advantageous for early stage R&D
teams to develop craft-like skills and test protocols geared towards individual devices
than to spend time and resources developing robust manufacturable designs.
We hope, however, to have shown through SPC analysis of even small data sets,
that there is indeed much to be gained from analysis of process control and capability in
the early stage R&D environment. Results from a small number of devices can identify
which processes are in control and which are not. Patterns across devices can be used to
identify material which may have seen abnormal processing conditions. Correlations
from beginning to end of process may be used to identify material to pull to the side to
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make room for more promising material to be processed. On the design side, it is as
important to know which processes are in control as on the manufacturing side. If a
process is not in control, then there is no way to conduct controlled designed experiments
with intentional changes in the design space.
It is hard to argue that starting many of the best practices called out by the MRL
metrics will be detrimental to R&D progress. In fact, one could argue that following
many of these practices could ultimately be advantageous to the team. In a competitive
funding world where contracts and future investments are uncertain, the team which is
more prepared to turn technology into a product will be advantaged. Documenting
process capability can be beneficial both when processes are in control, where it
demonstrates capability, and when problems may be present, where it may serve as a
justification for retaining process improvement funding. The intent of the MRL process
is to move funding forwards to address manufacturability concerns, and as long as a
credible plan to improve processes is present, it should be more beneficial to spend these
dollars early rather than late. Finally, in an environment in which make/buy evaluations
are on the horizon, process control data on in-house processing provides a benchmark by
which to assess potential competing suppliers, and, in the event that superior performance
can ultimately be demonstrated in-house, to potentially retain technology responsibility.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
To conclude, we return to several of the questions posed at the outset of our study.
What could be the effect of independently applying commercial best practices for new
product development from the very early stages of technology creation, on the part of the
defense contractor, in a bottom up approach? If a product development team uses the
MRL framework, will the contractor be better positioned in the long run? Is this
framework sufficient? If not, what other types of concerns should be addressed during
technology development? We review first how these questions are answered for new
product development in defense in general, and then how the answers are validated by the
learnings from our case study.
7.1 Learnings for New Product Development in Defense
We have seen in this work that commercial best practices coupled with relevant
defense industry metrics can indeed be integrated to provide a set of NPD metrics for
defense contractors, even in early stage R&D programs. Metrics such as Manufacturing
Readiness Levels can provide defense-relevant criteria against which to evaluate new
technology programs. These evaluations successfully allow identification of key issues
critical to delivering a quality product in a cost-effective and time-effective manner. By
reviewing relevant issues early in the design cycle, firms should be able to avoid costly
work-around fixes later in system deployment stages.
Contractors who use MRL criteria can expect to gain a competitive advantage by
understanding product and processes at an early stage, and by identifying areas for
improvement. Using a pro-active general approach with simple criteria may be
preferable, in fact, to following a full-blown top-down mandated approach. We saw in
our case study that much can be learned from simple manufacturing readiness
assessments and process evaluations, without using the detailed web-based checklists
being developed for the formal EMRL and MRL roll-outs. NPD processes in defense
today lag behind commercial NPD processes by about two generations, as the extensive
checklists being developed for the EMRL and MRL frameworks parallel first-generation
Stage-GateTM processes, rather than the more flexible third-generation processes. There
is a risk that the higher level of detail and structure in the more extensive checklist
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formats will slow down learning by making contractors focus more on the evaluation
process itself and less on the learning from the evaluation. This risk will need to be
monitored closely by the DoD and the GAO as the EMRL and MRL assessment
methodologies are formally incorporated into defense acquisition regulations. More
gains might be obtained by the DoD by providing additional funds for the Man Tech
program or by requiring that its own funding agencies incorporate MRL metrics into
contracts, than by further developing extensive methods to monitor MRL compliance.
We do find that the xRL metrics should also be supplemented with additional
commercial best practices in order to facilitate project and firm success. As first-
generation processes, primarily focused on measuring quality of execution at the contract
level for an external customer, the xRLs do not address critical success factors internal to
the firm. Firms should thus also conduct independent assessments of programs, to make
sure they fit strategically with the firm's business goals, that they are financially viable,
and that the firm itself will have a competitive advantage. To a large extent, this implies
that firms need to take back some of the responsibility which they have deferred to the
contract funding agencies, re-activating their own responsibility for project down-
selection. Finally, firms also have responsibility for structuring programs
organizationally for success. Teams must have clear accountable leaders, clear technical
objectives to meet, and sufficient support from management to meet them. In cases
where a technology is being developed for multiple defense purposes, this may mean that
the firm takes it upon itself to define a team responsible for maturing the technology
platform as a whole. Such a firm-specific development team may be the best way to
avoid the pitfall of focusing too much on detailed changes for individual contracts and of
focusing too little on fundamental technology development. This type of approach
should help the firm to constantly move forward technically, even in uncertain funding
environments, but will need to be carefully balanced with customer desires for individual
dedicated teams.
7.2 Learnings for the Firm
We have demonstrated through a case study of an optical component being
developed on defense R&D dollars that when best practices are actively applied, the firm
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can find opportunities to gain a competitive edge in the long run. Specific results from
the internship study were incorporated into organizational and contract changes related to
the optical component development at the host firm. Organizationally, a key point person
has now been designated who is responsible for technical maturation of the optical
component itself to support all contract platforms. At a financial level, the leadership
team has committed to one specific capital investment path for the next three years and
has moved from an "opportunistic" approach to one of measured decisions. At the
technical level, in-situ process control monitoring is being implemented within the device
fabrication facility, a database is being developed, and process documentation is being
updated. All reports to date indicate that the R&D team has made significant progress on
existing contracts since these changes were made. Finally, for a key contract, a
technology development roadmap incorporating both TRL and MRL milestones and
go/no-go decisions for additional capital has now been identified. A pro-active approach
is also being taken with this customer to pursue a formal MRL assessment on the contract
in 2007.
Overall, the division learned several key lessons from the case study analysis. At
a technical level, both the systems engineering group and the R&D group had been
unaware of some of the requirements in component manufacturing, such as certification
of suppliers. Identification of sole/foreign sourcing issues in the liquid crystal was
deemed particularly useful, as was the reminder that the firm is ultimately responsible.
The precedence relations highlighted by the EMRL structure clarified that new
technology elements cannot be "on-ramped" at a later stage without pulling the entire
system back in maturity. Most comprehensively, the analysis tools introduced for
strategic, financial, and technical evaluation provided a new framework which the
division plans to incorporate into future new technology development plans at the
component and system level. The firm sees that it has independent choices to make as it
executes on existing and future contracts.
The theme which seemed to resurface over and over in our MRL assessment is
that in order to ensure a high level of readiness for future production, there must be a
change in mindset from the search for "hero" results to the development of a
manufacturable product which meets or will meet key performance metrics. Key to this
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is a shift from the performance of one to the performance of many. This shift must take
place both at the contractor and at the customer level, where the customer must decide on
the performance level required. With their early introduction of yield and process control
analysis, the MRL metrics can hopefully serve as a tool to start this change. From the
firm's standpoint, this shift has to occur. Perpetual returns on low volume early stage
R&D contracts are insufficient to justify large capital expenditures needed to support the
technology. The firm has to reach the higher volume systems deployment and
demonstration contracts at MRL 7 and above in order for it to reap the benefit of
investment in the technology. Effectively, while delivery of "best effort" is compatible
with early R&D contractual requirements, the firm must make sure that internally it has a
clear path to meeting performance targets at later stages.
One finding from our case study is that the firm is in fact further towards the
beginning of the product development cycle than originally thought. Although this could
be seen as a setback, it also can be seen as an opportunity. Armed now with a better set
of tools with which to evaluate technology progress the firm can make more informed
decisions as to what paths are in fact the best to follow. Using the best practices
reviewed here, the final product should have a better long term probability of success.
110
References
[1] BEST PRACTICES: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early
Improves Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-02-701, United States General Accounting
Office Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, July 2002.
[2] DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience
Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD's Revised Policy, GAO-06-368, United
States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, April
2006.
[3] Robert G. Cooper, Winning at New Products: Accelerating the Process from Idea
to Launch (New York: Basic Books, 2001, 3 rd edition).
[4] Robert G. Cooper, Product Leadership: Creating and Launching Superior New
Products (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 1998).
[5] Mankins, John C., "TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS: A White Paper,"
Advanced Concepts Office, Office of Space Access and Technology, NASA April
6, 1995.
[6] Fiorino, Thomas D., "Engineering Manufacturing Readiness Levels: A White
Paper, " Andrulis Corporation, October 30, 2001.
[7] Morgan, James, "Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs) and Manufacturing
Readiness Assessments (MRAs), " presentation, US Air Force, Manufacturing
Technology Division, AFRL/MLMP, August 2006.
[8] Russell, W., "An Orientation to: Manufacturing Readiness Levels and
Manufacturing Readiness Assessments, " presentation, Manufacturing Technology
Division, AFRL/MLME, June 2006.
[9] Schmidt, J. B., "Gate Decisions: The key to managing risk during new product
development." In The PDMA Handbook of New Product Development, ed. K. B.
Kahn (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005, 2 "d edition), pp. 337-348.
[10] Peters, T. J., Thriving on Chaos (New York: Harper and Row, 1988) quoted in
[4], p. 72.
[11] Repenning, N. R., and Sterman, J. D., "Nobody ever gets creditforfixing
problems that never happened: Creating and sustaining process improvement,"
California Management Review, 33, 4, pp. 64-88, 2001.
[12] "Defense Science Board Task Force on The Manufacturing Technology Program:
A Key to Affordably Equipping the Future Force," Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C. 20301-
3140, February 2006.
[13] Details of cost reimbursement fees were sourced from the 2005 Annual Report of
the firm in our case study.
[14] Interview with Dr. David Shaver, Director, Solid State Division, MIT Lincoln
Laboratory, September 1, 2006.
111
[15] DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on Weapons
Systems Investments, GAO 06-585T, statement of David M. Walker Comptroller
General of the United States, Testimony Before the Armed Services Committee,
House of Representatives, April 5, 2006.
[16] Defense Acquisitions: Incentives and Pressures That Drive Problems Affecting
Satellite and Related Acquisitions, GAO 05-570R, United States General
Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, June 23, 2005.
[17] DOD ACQUISITION OUTCOMES: A Case for Change, GAO 06-257T,
statement of Katherine V. Schinasi, Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on AirLand, Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. Senate, November 15, 2005.
[18] DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: DoD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices,
but More Controls Are Needed, GAO-04-53, Report to the Senate and House
Committees on Armed Services, November 2003.
[19] "Engineering Manufacturing Readiness Levels (EMRL), Implementation Guide,"
U.S. Missile Defense Agency, 2006.
[20] Fiorino, Thomas D., "Evaluating Contractor Engineering and Manufacturing
Readiness," presentation, DCMA Aeronautical Systems Division Commanders'
Conference, Boston, MA, 27 September 2006.
[21] Interview with Thomas D. Fiorino, Advanced Product Transitions Corporation,
August 2, 2006.
[22] Interview with Andrew Loose, Manufacturing Technology Division,
AFRL/MLME, August 15, 2006.
[23] Manufacturing Readiness Assessments (AFRL presentation, "MRAs for PGM K-
0, short.ppt").
[24] Interview with James Morgan, US Air Force, Manufacturing Technology
Division, AFRL/MLMP, September 5, 2006.
[25] Charles H. Fine, Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary
Advantage (New York: Basic Books, 1998).
[26] "MRL guide," Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel Manufacturing
Readiness Level Working Group, first downloaded September 2006 from
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=109616. Updated version posted
February 2007.
[27] DoD SBIR/STTR awards database: http://www.dodsbir.net/Awards/Default.asp.
112
